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Preface 
Jonathan Kempen behandelt in seiner MA Arbeit ein klassisches Thema der Sozialethno-
logie: wie sind Normen des Teilens, Moralität und Alltagshandeln miteinander verknüpft. 
In der Ethnologie ist „Teilen“ ein prominentes Thema insbesondere in der Ethnographie 
egalitärer, vor allem wildbeuterischer Gesellschaften. Ethnographien arbeiten sich dabei 
meist an zwei Positionen ab: während die einen das Teilen als einen Akt reziproken Aus-
tauschs verstehen, als Gabe auf die stets eine Gegengabe folgt, betonen die anderen, 
dass Teilen vor allem als moralischer Akt verstanden wird und in einem ökonomischen 
Sinne keine Gegengaben verlangt. Kempen gelingt es sehr gut diese unterschiedlichen 
Positionen herauszuarbeiten und für seine eigene Arbeit in angemessene Fragestellun-
gen zu überführen. Er stellt dabei heraus, dass „sharing“ sich in der Ethnographie meist 
auf das Teilen von Nahrungsmitteln bezieht, während reziproker Tausch deutlich eher mit 
dem Austausch von Nicht-Lebensmitteln verbunden ist.  
Seine dreimonatige Feldarbeit führte Kempen auf zwei namibischen Resettlement Farmen 
in der Omaheke Region durch. Beide Resettlement Farmen werden hauptsächlich von 
San bewohnt, aber auch Mitglieder anderer ethnischer Gruppen siedeln dort. Auf vorbildli-
che Art und Weise generiert Kempen Daten aus teilnehmender Beobachtung, offenen 
Interviews, einer Netzwerkanalyse (egozentrierte Netzwerke), einfachen Verfahren der 
kognitiven Ethnologie und Extended Case Studies. Kurz stellt er auch seine Versuche mit 
experimentellen Situationen dar. Es gelingt Kempen sehr gut, aus den empirischen Daten 
neue Erkenntnisse abzuleiten. Dabei ist seine Ausgangshypothese in dem Ausruf „Sha-
ring is over!“ – Teilen spielt in der heutigen Gemeinschaft der Resettlement Schemes kei-
ne Rolle mehr – klar formuliert. Kempen untersucht in seiner Arbeit, auf welchen Ebenen 
Teilen in einer post-jägerischen Gesellschaft weiterhin von Bedeutung ist; denn schon 
erste Interviews zeigten ihm, dass über Teilen auch weiterhin sehr viel gesprochen und 
diskutiert wird – und Teilen zumindest als Norm- und Wertidee weiterhin sehr präsent ist.  
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Abstract 
One very popular field of investigation in hunter-gatherer research is normative sharing as 
a means to sustain egalitarian structures within hunting and gathering societies. It has 
been hypothesized that such sharing practices may inhibit economic development in 
these societies as they are based on immediate-return strategies. In a world that is in-
creasingly based on delayed-return subsistence and long-term planning the sharing 
norms that are widely associated with the San groups of Southern Africa may be an ob-
stacle to their economic performance. However, it remains to be evaluated to what extent 
such norms are still a part of their daily life and whether their sedentarization together with 
other groups has caused a change in their sharing behavior. Looking at two Namibian 
resettlements with a considerably large number of San, this case study evaluates the role 
of sharing among former hunter-gathers in relation to neighboring ‘Non-San’ groups. It 
finds that there is no substantial difference in the performance and likeliness of sharing 
between San and ‘Non-San’ in Skoonheid and Drimiopsis, but it continues to play a strong 
discursive role in both fractions. This dissonance between the absence of normative shar-
ing practices and the continuity of sharing as a discursive tool reveals the actual dilemma. 
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1. Introduction – An Explanation of the Title 
To use a quote which claims that “Sharing is over!” in the title of a study on Namibian Re-
settlement – consequently dealing with the Omaheke San1 – may seem risky in an aca-
demic environment where the importance of sharing norms to the egalitarianism of hunter-
gatherer2 societies has been stressed on several occasions. When preparing my field re-
search in March of 2014 I stayed in Windhoek to consult with local NGOs and listened to 
the things that the capital’s inhabitants had to say about the San. Among the most memo-
rable statements that a self-declared San-expert had to convey at a local tavern was the 
sentence: “Sharing is over my friend!” This rather succinct way of summarizing the status 
of sharing among the San seemed too simplistic to be taken seriously at that time, but it 
cropped up again during my field research in Skoonheid half a year later. Among the first 
people that I interviewed was James B. (65 years old) who started laughing when I asked 
him about sharing in the community and he explained:  
Sharing is over Mister3! The sharing is like that… now when they 
eat, when they have food at home they eat together. But when 
they got also in the trouble they give maybe4 the other one the 
cow to help the other one like this and that. Now tell me now, the 
government bring now cows and give every household cattle cattle 
cattle… now maybe if I’m a San now and I have four sons or five 
and every son has an own house… and I’m sitting here in my 
house as the father and the government give me two cattle and 
every one of my sons two here, two here, two here, two, two… is 
twelve then and I, the father, take them and look after them… now 
who’s got the most support now? Where is the difference now? 
And there is other poor people there and they have nothing… is 
this sharing now or what? Only the big ones profit, this the truth! Is 
not sharing! 
James B. offers the characterization of a sharing system that has been transformed from 
a social insurance mechanism in food distribution into a tool of wealth accumulation. This 
perspective is based on his own dynamic identity, for which he claims San, Herero, and 
German ancestry and the usage of Khoekhoegowab5 and English at home. His relation-                                                           
1
 “In general, San individuals identify themselves according to their ethnic group, i.e. Ju|’hoansi, 
!Xun, Hai||om, Naro, Khwe or !Xoon, rather than as ‘San’, which is, like ‘Bushmen’, an external 
term.” (Dieckmann et al. 2014: xiii) 
2
 “’Hunter-gatherer’ is a contested term. At the ‘Man the Hunter’ conference, it became abundantly 
clear that gathering supplied proportionately more food in most hunter-gathering societies than did 
hunting. New appellations, such as gatherer-hunter and forager, emerged.” (Solway 2006:75)  In 
this thesis, the terms ‘hunter-gatherer’ and ‘forager’ are used interchangeably 
3
 Translated from Afrikaans: “Meneer” 
4
 Translated from Afrikaans: “miskien” 
5
 Commonly referred to as “Damara-taal” – “Damara-language” 
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ship to ‘being San’ and its stereotypes mirrors the situation of the San in all of Southern 
Africa. There are numerous studies on the developments that different San groups have 
gone through in the recent decades and most of them stress their difficulties in developing 
an identity which fits for all the different San groups. There are mixed or hybrid identities 
based on language and genetic heritage. Some groups are caught in an essentialist dis-
course on ‘authentic indigeneity’ and the struggle for land rights (Sylvain 2002, Widlok 
2010) while others try to leave behind the negative stereotypes that history has marked 
them with and that society continues to impose upon them (Dieckmann et al. 2014).  
Being simultaneously a member and an outside observer of the society that he describes, 
it is obvious that James B. has an ambivalent opinion about sharing. On the one hand, he 
explains that sharing is actively practiced. On the other, he declares its official end. So 
why then would that short and provoking sentence “Sharing is over!” be a suitable opener 
for this thesis if it is so ambiguous and seemingly non-telling in this case? Actually, it fits 
for that same reason: sharing in this context is no longer as clearly defined as it used to 
be and has been subject to new definitions and identity systems. One could supplement 
the phrase “as we knew it” to make the quote even more applicable. For cases like the 
resettled Omaheke San, role and function of sharing need to be reassessed as it is no 
longer part of an immediate-return subsistence system. This implies that the ways it has 
been analyzed and defined as leveling-mechanism in the context of Woodburn’s “Egalitar-
ian Societies” (1982) or as a response to environmental factors (Layton 2005), are not 
appropriate anymore and that “sharing” in this sense might actually be “over”. It has been 
adjusted to daily circumstances and now serves as an identity marker for those who do no 
longer fit the description of the ‘authentic bushman’. As Renée Sylvain notes: 
[T]he Omaheke farm San, despite their conditions of dependency, still exercise 
considerable autonomy in the creation of their cultural identity – they have a hand 
in the invention of their own traditions. If we want to find the ‘authentic’ San, we 
must look to the world the San made for themselves (2006: 196). 
However, if sharing is to be redefined in the way it is practiced and the way it serves San 
society today, it must also be assessed to what extent it can still be seen as a social norm. 
Is a certain sharing behavior demanded by society and are people who do not adhere to 
that demand being sanctioned? Also it needs to be asked to what extent there are differ-
ences within society as a whole. The Resettlement Farms in Namibia’s Omaheke Region 
are not only inhabited by people with San identity. These ‘Non-San’6 groups (mostly Da-                                                           
6
 ‘Non-San’ will be used as an analytical category in this thesis and is just like ‘San’ or ‘Bushmen’ 
an external label. Surely, the people included in this category would never label themselves as 
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mara) live under the same “conditions of dependency” that Sylvain describes above. The 
two groups have adopted livelihood strategies from each other and therefore the Non-San 
definition of sharing needs to be taken into account as well. If the concept of sharing as a 
social norm, in the way it was known to social and cultural anthropologists as a unique 
San trademark, is actually “over”, its current role and function among the surrounding 
groups is of importance as well.  
The remainder of this opening chapter offers a short (and surely not complete) introduc-
tion to some anthropological perspectives on sharing in hunter gatherer societies, a short 
introduction of post-independence resettlement history in the Omaheke Region and a 
presentation of the research question. The second chapter will present more background 
information on the research setting and introduce the applied methods. The results of 
these methods will then be presented in the third chapter according to the relevant topics 
and contrast groups. Finally, the description of two non-representative field experiments in 
the fourth and final chapter will provide the imagery to summarize the research findings 
and to conclude this thesis.  
 
1.1 The Role of Sharing in Hunter-Gatherer Societies  
Successful human foragers often share their take with those who acquire less. 
This propensity to share has puzzled anthropologists, who have long noted the 
prevalence of sharing among human groups and its rarity in other animal species. 
Social anthropologists have proposed a variety of functionalist explanations about 
why humans share, such as the exchange ethic (Mauss 1967) or generalized reci-
procity (Levi-Strauss 1969). (Bird & Bird 1997). 
The anthropological and ethnographic discourse on the meaning and function of sharing 
in hunter-gatherer studies is as old as hunter-gatherer studies itself. Leaving different 
tendencies of interpretation of the anthropological disciplines throughout the colonial ages 
aside, the starting point for a distinct analysis of hunting and gathering societies is usually 
stated to be the 1966 conference labeled ‘Man the hunter’ in Chicago. For the 1960s, the 
Rousseauian dichotomy of natural purity versus cultural pollution, which interprets hunting 
and gathering societies as more natural and therefore more human than others (Barnard 
1983: 194), formed the starting point of interpretation. It was then developed into a rever-
sion of the assumption that these societies are permanently starving and having little lei-
                                                                                                                                                                                 
such and that is why it is spelled in single quotes at this point. Hereinafter it will be spelled without 
single quotes, though, to make the caption appear less erratic.   
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sure time. Marshall and Lee observed that adult !Kung7 in Namibia and Botswana spend 
only two to three hours on subsistence activities per day and further noted that sharing 
functions as a redistribution of wealth (ibid: 197). This enables members of hunting and 
gathering societies to follow what Sahlins has defined as the ‘Zen road to affluence’, a 
lifestyle of few needs, low accumulation of goods and satisfaction through low amounts of 
labor time. It is juxtaposed to ‘the Galbraithian way,’ which is based on the assumption 
that man’s needs are great but the means are limited (Sahlins 2006: 80).  
After further interpretations of hunter-gatherer mode of living in the 1970s, which were 
usually based on Marxist perspectives (Barnard 1983, Lee 1992), James Woodburn finally 
introduced his theory on “Egalitarian Societies” in 1982, which up to today forms the basis 
for discussions on the role of sharing in hunter-gatherer societies. Based on his own field 
research among the Hadza (Tanzania) and the documentation of !Kung life by Marshall 
and Lee, Woodburn added some refinements to Sahlins’ concept of “The Original Affluent 
Society” and introduced the categories of ‘immediate-return’ and ‘delayed-return’ as 
means to classify hunting and gathering societies:  
Briefly put, in economies of immediate-return systems ‘people usually obtain an 
immediate yield for their labor, use this yield with minimal delay and place minimal 
emphasis on property relations’ in contrast to delayed-return systems, ‘in which 
people place more emphasis on property rights, rights which are usually but not 
always linked with delayed return on labor’ (Woodburn in Solway 2006: 69). 
 
Further, he stated that delayed-return may be more variable and may in the end lead to 
agricultural subsistence systems, but they can never be the basis for egalitarian social 
systems (Woodburn 1982: 434), as delayed-return relies on task specialization, intergen-
erational authority and certain kinship ties (Woodburn 2005: 21). An egalitarian immedi-
ate-return society must apply certain leveling mechanisms to eliminate distinctions of 
wealth, power and status while usually gender-based distinctions remain due to division of 
labor. According to Widlok (2005: 14) the strongest leveling mechanisms are not based on 
institutional rules, but are part of everyday behavior and discourse. Woodburn’s original 
paper (1982) contained six leveling-mechanisms, but in subsequent discussion (2005) he 
only mentioned three of them, which are listed below:                                                            
7
 San languages make use of click sounds of which three will be referred to in this thesis due to 
language and group names. In common orthography they appear as follows: 
- ! describes an alveopalatal click as in “!Kung”  
- /’ describes a dental click with a glottal stop as in “Ju/’hoansi”  
- // describes a lateral click as in “Hai//om” (Lee 1979: xxv) 
In some orthographies / matches | and // matches ||.  
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- Mobility and flexibility: Fundamental nomadism of immediate-return hunter-
gatherers with small, frequently moving camps in an area that usually provides a 
year’s subsistence includes full access rights for any individual. Monopolies on re-
sources in an area do not exist and it is easy for an individual to separate from 
conflicts without essential economic punishment. The ability of individuals to attach 
or detach themselves at will from grouping and relationship inhibits the develop-
ment of group authorities.  
- Access to food and other resources: The association of land to a certain group or 
person is only a means of identification while no exclusive rights over land and the 
resources within exist. Knowledge is the only prerequisite to acquire food. The free 
use of resources limits dependence and domestic authority. 
- Sharing: Differences in yields of food production should not be used to build wealth 
and dependencies to ensure an egalitarian social structure. Woodburn interprets 
the so-called “waves of sharing” (1982: 441) as a form of taxation. 
To Woodburn, ideology (i.e. egalitarianism) is the causative principle for immediate-return 
systems and the so-called leveling mechanisms such as sharing. He rejects the stance 
that environmental and evolutionary factors caused them, which has, however, been sub-
ject to dispute. For example, Hayden (1994) notes that the character of a resource deter-
mines the protection mechanisms being developed by the community. Layton (2005) ex-
plains that freedom of movement and unrestricted access to resources is usually a re-
sponse to the unpredictability of resources such as wild game or rainfall. Also, the defend-
ing of a resource is often not economic enough and mutual access often functions as 
some kind of insurance mechanism. In this case, part of the problem may be that early 
anthropologists have claimed their own irreplaceability in hunter-gatherer studies and 
therefore show a certain distrust towards other disciplines: “Only part of the behavior of 
hunter-gatherers can be accounted for by even the most fine-grained ecological analysis.” 
(Lee in Wiessner 1982: 61). 
Further academic disputes on sharing usually include the aspect of reciprocity. In the 
1970s, Sahlins and Levi-Strauss amongst others analyzed sharing as generalized reci-
procity, which is a favored perspective up to today: 
Why do people share what they value—even though they cannot count on a re-
turn? When ethnographic accounts of sharing enter wider social science discus-
sions, a twofold strategy for solving this apparent paradox emerges. Both strands 
of this strategy attempt to escape the paradox by incorporating the phenomenon of 
sharing into the dominant theory of value derived from monetized markets and re-
ciprocal exchanges. Sharing is either redefined as a covert form of market behav-
ior or as ultimately governed by extended forms of reciprocity. (Widlok 2013: 11). 
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Most arguments in the debate on reciprocity are closely linked to the phenomenon of meat 
sharing due to the fact that this is one of the most frequently described sharing processes 
among immediate-return hunter-gatherers. The so-called hunting-sharing complex is a 
uniquely human invention (Ichikawa 2005: 156), in which the following observations have 
been made and frequently discussed. First, hunting success differs and the good hunter 
never gets back as much as he gives. Second, the entitlement to a share of meat does 
not depend on the receiver’s previous donations. Third, most often sharing is not in the 
interest of the donor but imposed by the community. This is also called ‘demand sharing’ 
and will be relevant in the discussion of sanctions upon norm infringement. The fourth 
observation is that often the meat belongs to the owner of the arrow, trap, or net and not 
to the hunter himself. While the owner takes the responsibility of sharing, the hunter’s ef-
fort may be rewarded through prestige and support in bad times. Often it is more im-
portant that an owner exists than who the actual owner is (Ichikawa 2005: 162).  
To summarize all debates and arguments on sharing reciprocity would fill a large book as 
it is also linked to the “Great Kalahari Debate” (Welsch & Endicott 2006: 107) between 
traditionalists (Solway et al. 1990) and revisionists (Wilmsen 1989) and furthermore in-
volves contributions of other scientific disciplines such as economics (Chakraborty 2006). 
Generally, one can say that food sharing may originally have been based on ecological 
factors and may still be restrained by them. However, it has developed into a social norm 
that developed into part and parcel of an egalitarian ideology and may be seen as a recip-
rocal activity depending on the time frame of observation. Further references to current 
debates and contributions will be made in the main parts of this thesis. 
 
1.2 Post-Independence Resettlement in Namibia’s Omaheke Region 
According to the census from 2011 the San are the fifth largest language group in Oma-
heke Region after the Herero (41.5%), Nama/Damara (28.1%), Afrikaans (10.0%) and 
Oshiwambo-speaking people (6.7%) (NSA 2011: 42). Furthermore, 
There are three main San groups: the Ju|’hoansi, living primarily in the northern 
and central areas; the Naro in the east; and the !Xoon in the south […]. There are 
also a small number of ’N|oha families living in the southern part of the so-called 
‘Corridor area’ in southern Omaheke. (Dieckmann et al. 2014: 42). 
The colonial history of contact between the San of Southern Africa and European ethnog-
raphers is a very long one, which cannot easily be summarized at this point for reasons of 
space and relevance; different San groups went through very different political and eco-
nomic developments. Well-written summaries on pre-colonial and colonial ‘Bushmen’ his-
tory have been contributed by Gordon (2000), Gordon & Douglas (2000) and another de-
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scription of historical and current issues is provided by Hohmann (2003: 1-35). At this 
point only the Omaheke San and their post-independence resettlement will be of interest, 
although very recent history cannot be told without reference to South African Apartheid 
policies nonetheless: 
Two very different historical trajectories of colonial rule and identity formation were 
followed in the case of the Namibia San. For those San living in what is now the 
Otjozondjupa Region, colonial rule, and later apartheid, took the form of geograph-
ical, economic and political segregation and containment on reserves and an eth-
nic homeland (Bushmanland), where they were able to maintain a foraging lifestyle 
until fairly recently. But other groups–such as the Omaheke San–experienced co-
lonial rule and apartheid as a process of complete land dispossession and eventu-
al incorporation into the lowest stratum of a racialized and ethnically hierarchical 
class system. These two historical trajectories were reflected by the colonial dis-
tinction between the ‘wild’ hunting and gathering Bushmen, and the ‘tame’ farm la-
bouring Bushmen. (Sylvain 2003: 112). 
The fact that the San in Omaheke Region, which has been characterized by Gordon & 
Douglas as “a vast, flat, seemingly monotonous, stoneless expanse” (2000b: 7), have 
been labeled ‘tame’ and ‘unauthentic’ has made them invisible or at least uninteresting to 
most research groups and the wide public (Sylvain 2006). The famous Harvard Kalahari 
Research Group and their Kalahari Peoples Fund mostly focused on the !Kung in the for-
mer homeland and in Botswana and thereby supported them in their strive for indigenous 
land rights (Biesele 2006). Meanwhile, however, the majority of the San population, espe-
cially in Omaheke Region, was struggling to gain proper humanitarian and academic at-
tention due to their ‘tameness’ in the years around Namibian independence. The San in 
Omaheke Region are mostly Ju/’hoansi8, who constitute the second largest San group in 
Namibia with a population of 7,000 behind the Hai//om with a population of 11,000 
(Biesele & Hitchcock 2011: 5f). 
According to Suzman, the Omaheke used to, and continues to be “divided into commer-
cial and communal farming blocks. The commercial farming block was comprised of hun-
dreds of white owned farms […]. To the north of these farms lay the communal farming 
areas, former ‘native reserves’ for the Herero and Mbanderu” (2000: 12). The San, lacking 
any tenure rights in this area, were forced to make a living in one of the two blocks and 
“came to constitute an often-scorned underclass of cheap labour” (Suzman 2002: 22). 
After independence, the San’s overall situation in Omaheke Region and in the whole of 
Namibia did not improve as many farmers began to lay off excess staff due to fear of poli-
cy changes. The fact that the Omaheke had a relatively large San population and that its                                                            
8
 According to Biesele & Hitchcock (2011) the term “Ju/’hoansi” is used for the language and the 
people, while “Ju/’hoan” is only used as an adjective. 
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economy is mainly based on cattle farming left large numbers of San families stranded 
after losing their workplaces: 
As a result, the San were foremost on the list of the intended beneficiaries of the 
resettlement lands purchased under the Agricultural Land Reform Act (1995). This 
Act empowered the government to purchase commercial farmland to resettle the 
most marginalized of Namibia’s landless rural poor. (ibid: 23). 
The most recent data suggests that a total of 192 farms amounting to 872 230 ha 
of freehold land previously owned by white commercial farmers has been trans-
ferred to previously disadvantaged Namibians in Omaheke since Independence. 
[…] In all, approximately one quarter of all the freehold land in Omaheke has been 
transferred to previously disadvantaged Namibians since Independence. (Werner 
& Odendaal 2010: 55). 
Apart from other more commercial approaches in the land reform and resettlement pro-
cess, the majority of resettled San in Namibia got a new place to live in so-called group 
resettlement projects or group holdings. These were supposed to cater to “a formal or 
non-formal group composed of people who cannot form a co-operative but are interested 
in engaging in agricultural or other production as a group” (ibid: 23). In other words, land-
less people were given a piece of land on a farm, bought by the government, where they 
were to engage in agriculture together with other resettled families. “By 2010, at least 55 
group resettlement projects had been set up under the auspices of the MLR, and at least 
23 of these have considerable numbers of San beneficiaries” (Dieckmann et al. 2014: 
448). Out of these 23 projects, six are located in Omaheke Region (i.e. Blouberg, Vergen-
oeg, Tsjaka/Ben-Hur, Drimiopsis, Skoonheid, Donkerbos-Sonneblom). These six farms 
differ in the way that GRN and MLR acquired them and also in the different developments 
that they have gone through since then. The latter three were part of DRFN’s Livelihood 
Support Programs (LISUP I + II) from 2007 until March 2015 in cooperation with the MLR 
and other NGOs and institutions: “LISUP is an integrated rural development programme 
aimed at improving living conditions and food security in the resettlement projects by 
building capacity and developing skills” (Dieckmann et al. 2014: 53). Although group re-
settlement projects were supposed to be self-sufficient after receiving governmental sup-
port (i.e. houses, equipment, water, seeds, etc.) for the first five years, it turned out very 
soon that they would not succeed (Werner & Odendaal 2010: 24). Apart from economic 
disappointments, overpopulation, and crime, one central problem in the group resettle-
ments in Omaheke Region is inter-cultural communication and cooperation: 
In group resettlement farms, many San live together with Damara farmers, and 
sometimes also Herero or Tswana farmers. Most of the time, collaboration be-
tween San people and people of these other ethnic groups is hard to find; instead 
leaders of different factions in the community will try to control access to valuable 
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project resources, equipment and income-generating projects. (Dieckmann et al. 
2014: 88). 
Issues of cooperation within the community are closely related to the issue of sharing and 
the social norms that it corresponds with. As the title of this thesis and the previous de-
scriptions may reveal, the field research relevant for this case study was conducted on 
two of the above mentioned farms, Drimiopsis and Skoonheid. Drimiopsis, located 45 km 
north of Omaheke Region’s capital Gobabis, comprises 2,262 ha of land and was taken 
over by the GRN from the Tswana Legislative Authority (TLA) in 1991 and officially estab-
lished as a group resettlement project in 1993 (Dirkx & Alweendo 2012: 8; Dieckmann et 
al. 2014: 449). Sixty brick houses were constructed, but soon Drimiopsis became over-
populated and many people were once again resettled, most of them to Skoonheid. 
Skoonheid, located 120 
km north of Gobabis, 
was bought and estab-
lished as a resettlement 
project in 1993. Sixty 
brick houses enabled 
the influx of people, 
mostly Ju/’hoansi and 
Damaras (Dieckmann 
et al. 2014: 44). It com-
prises 7104 ha of which 
currently merely 2100 
ha are available to the 
resettled people (DRFN 
2009: 13) as the rest 
has been “occupied by 
Herero speakers and 
their livestock, leaving 
only the central area for 
the intended settlers.” 
(Suzman 2000: 14). One of the dominant families in Skoonheid are the Langmans of 
which Frederik Langman was elected as Traditional Authority of the Omaheke Ju/’hoansi 
in 1996, but it took until 2009 for him to be formally recognized by the GRN (Dieckmann et 
al. 2014: 72). 
Both places have received governmental and non-governmental support since their estab-
lishment. Education, food security, shelter, water and sanitation have been constant is-
 
Map 1.2.1 Research area 
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sues to the MLR, DRFN and other NGOs. Further details on demographic development of 
the research sites, livelihood and subsistence issues will be given in chapters two and 
three below. 
 
1.3 Research Question 
Hunter-gatherer societies with immediate-return systems are unique in the degree 
to which almost all of the social contexts within these societies maximize equality 
although, of course, members of most of these societies today have much experi-
ence of inequality – usually profound inequality – in their dealings with members of 
other ethnic groups because, as people identified as hunter-gatherers, they are so 
politically weak and so subject to discrimination. (Woodburn 2005: 22). 
It has been stated by many different scholars (e.g. Biesele & Hitchcock 2011: 62-64) that 
the San of Southern Africa are facing a leadership dilemma. On the one hand, they need 
leadership with representative authority to stand up for their rights in land claims, cultural 
rights and politics. On the other, they are said to be originally egalitarian, not allowing for 
the establishment of individual leaders and property rights. If they were to allow leadership 
based on individuals to arise, this would be against their customs and thereby – as some 
may argue – annul their customary rights to land. Regarding this dilemma, Widlok (2010) 
has observed that those former hunter-gatherers in Namibia, who had stronger leadership 
structures and followed some delayed-return subsistence strategies, were more success-
ful in obtaining their rights. 
Just like James B. from Skoonheid has observed in the introductory section of this chap-
ter, sharing has advantages and disadvantages. Biesele & Hitchcock have observed that 
“the sharing ethic of the Ju/’oansi […] made it difficult for an individual to build up his 
herd”, because sharing demands “from relatives forced animals to be slaughtered and 
eaten prematurely” (2011: 90). It has been argued that the San would not only politically, 
but also economically be more successful if they were to abandon their egalitarian proper-
ty values. The accumulation of capital or simply the storage of seeds becomes extremely 
difficult if strong sharing norms exist within the surrounding society (Woodburn 1982: 447). 
According to Woodburn, egalitarian values are in contradiction with delayed-return activi-
ties (1982: 434) although he later speculated that 
a predatory and entrepreneurial form of immediate-return system in which the 
egalitarian ideology and system of social sanctions enforcing sharing are less 
elaborated and less effective […] could constitute a possible bridgehead for some 
entrepreneurial families to move into delayed return, particularly in, for African 
hunter-gatherers, those rare cases in which individuals have succeeded in gaining 
access to education and to stable, paid employment. (2005: 29). 
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Now, one might say that the Omaheke San have already moved beyond predatory imme-
diate return as they have been practicing agriculture and delayed-return strategies, as 
laborers or as entrepreneurs, for some generations. Therefore, for them sharing norms 
should not be of relevance anymore in comparison to those who only recently gave up 
hunting and gathering. The answer from an emic perspective is straightforward: 
There are those people from the old times, which used to live in the fields/bush, 
and who tried to help themselves. We, who are now here, we are now a bit too 
weak/poor. And we try to help each other and what we get is for all of us. It is not 
only for us, but for all of us. Those who are too weak/poor also get something. (Ar-
nold A., 40 yrs, from Skoonheid)9. 
Obviously, sharing remains part of everyday discourse among the San. The first research 
question therefore is: Is sharing in Skoonheid and Drimiopsis simply a discursive tool for 
identity construction or is it actually a social norm? Furthermore it needs to be asked: Do 
those who identify themselves as San in Skoonheid and Drimiopsis show stronger or 
weaker sharing norms than their Non-San neighbors? If this is the case, can sharing 
norms be one possible explanation for their weak economic performance? In this regard, 
further factors such as age, wealth, and place of living have been examined to account for 
differences beyond the identity/language line. 
                                                           
9
 Translated from Afrikaans: “Daar is mense wat nog in die ou tyd... wat in die velde was... hulle 
kan net self probeer om te help... en ons wat nou hier is, ons is nou eindelik net bietjie swak. En 
ons probeer nog om ons mekaar te help... wat ons kry, dis vir ons almal. Dis nie net vir ons, is vir 
ons almal. Hulle ook kan kry wat swak is.” 
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2. The Research Setting and the Applied Methods 
The field data was gathered between September 17th and December 9th 2014. During that 
time I was accommodated at Skoonheid’s central farm house, which serves as a point of 
gathering and administration, while also offering accommodation to MLR’s representatives 
and guests. James Suzman spent eighteen months (1994-96) in Omaheke Region and 
also lived on Skoonheid’s neighboring farm ‘Rosenhof’. During that time he befriended 
people whom I was to meet twenty years later and he experienced aspects of Ju/’hoan 
society which had not changed much upon my arrival. Knowing about his previous re-
search, I decided to postpone the lecture of his case study until the end of my research in 
Skoonheid and Drimiopsis as I did not want my perception to be influenced by his descrip-
tions. Another place of accommodation was available to me in Gobabis, which was helpful 
when conducting day-long research in Drimiopsis due to shorter driving distance and bet-
ter availability of petrol. 
The most recent baseline survey was conducted in 2011. At that point Skoonheid consist-
ed of “266 inhabitants, who permanently stay in Skoonheid, […] counted amongst 58 sur-
veyed households” and Drimiopsis was home to “829 persons divided over 128 house-
holds” (Dirkx & Alweendo 2012: 8-9). These numbers are very likely to be higher for 
Skoonheid and Drimiopsis at the moment according to the sources that I was able to ac-
cess during field work (see 2.2). 
Before my arrival in Skoonheid, I spent twelve days in Windhoek working on my language 
skills in Afrikaans and consulting with representatives of DRFN and LAC about research 
procedures. It must be noted, however, that in spite of previous learning efforts in Germa-
ny and Windhoek, my Afrikaans was far from perfect upon arrival. It took several weeks 
and some help from kind translators until I could fully participate in conversations. Howev-
er, Afrikaans and English are mostly used as lingua franca in the resettlements and are 
rarely spoken at home or used in conversations between individuals who share another 
language. According to the survey by Dirkx & Alweendo, 66 percent of Skoonheid’s popu-
lation speak a San language, Ju/’hoansi being the most dominant one. Khoekhoegowab is 
spoken by 24 percent in Skoonheid. In Drimiopsis, these two language groups are almost 
equally represented in number while making up 91 percent of the local population. As the 
research question made it necessary to assign ‘San’ and ‘Non-San’ labels to informants 
and their households, the language spoken at home by the research informants had to 
serve as the major indicator for that purpose. A distinction based on racial or other ethnic 
characteristics would have been inappropriate. However, when people were not able to 
speak Ju/hoansi or another San language they could still claim San identity. In this case I 
relied on information by other farm inhabitants whether this person or household was to 
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be regarded as San, Damara or any other. Further languages spoken in the area are 
Setswana, Otjiherero, Oshiwambo and Kavango. Due to my lack of skills with regard to 
Namibian languages other than Afrikaans and English, certain aspects of interaction and 
argument in daily life could not be grasped and/or fully understood. However, I claim that I 
was able to observe and document essential parts of resettlement life through translation, 
observation and written-down information. 
The following paragraphs summarize the methods that were applied in the field while their 
results will be presented and discussed in chapter three. I assigned so-called ‘informant 
codes’ to my informants, which were used in the digital data gathering process in order to 
ensure their anonymity when presenting the digital data to co-workers and representatives 
of institutions. The list of corresponding names was kept separate and secret. The codes 
were assigned according to the research stage at which the informants first participated 
(example in chart 2.5.1). 
 
2.1 Participant Observation 
Many different definitions of this method have been offered in the past decades and it re-
mains a sometimes confusing factor to students of popular ethnographic methods. Maybe 
this is due to the fact that every researcher finds his or her own way of practicing it and 
ends up with valuable data in most cases. I decided to stick to the following definition and 
adjust it according to my needs and possibilities: 
Participant observation involves immersing yourself in a culture and learning to 
remove yourself every day from that immersion so you can intellectualize what 
you’ve seen and heard, put it into perspective, and write about it convincingly. 
When it’s done right, participant observation turns fieldworkers into instruments of 
data collection and data analysis. (Bernard 2006: 344). 
The most important prerequisite for successful participant observation was in this case 
surely fulfilled by the possibility to stay in Skoonheid and partake in its inhabitants’ daily 
life. Committee meetings, pension payout, political rallies, football tournaments, work-
shops and elections were the official events that I was able to attend and observe. How-
ever, everyday events such as garden and construction work, disputes, injuries, admin-
istration requests or simply the acquisition and preparation of food were even more im-
portant to my topic. As the rare availability of cheap transport is one of the major issues to 
Skoonheid’s people, I was usually among the first to be approached when people needed 
a ride being one of the few people with a working car. While driving I was able to get ac-
quainted with key figures of the community and to learn from them. Although Skoonheid 
was my main place of stay, I made sure to be in Drimiopsis for the important events and 
also took time to hang out during the day while gathering data through other methods. I 
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carried pen and paper, camera and a Phillips Voice Tracer (DVT2000) with me at all times 
to be able to record interesting observations immediately. 
 
2.2 Wealth Ranking 
At the beginning of my stay in Skoonheid I conducted a wealth ranking process as pro-
posed by Grandin (1994: 21-35) using a list of 74 households provided by the representa-
tive of MLR for Skoonheid and the help of six informants, who had been approached via 
convenience sampling. The aim of this task was a better understanding for the situation of 
individual households, and the results were also used as a tool for balanced sampling at 
later research stages. 
Five separate interviews were conducted; 
one interview was conducted with two in-
formants at the same time. They were giv-
en the following task: to sort cards with the 
names of Skoonheid’s household heads 
according to their own knowledge and per-
ception of the given persons’ wealth. The 
informants were free to sort the house-
holds in as many groups as they found 
appropriate. They were asked to explain 
their choices and to name wealth indica-
tors. Apart from some common factors 
such as government jobs, the owning of a 
plot house, car or cattle, most informants 
stressed that they sorted the households 
according to intuition, explaining that there 
would be no large differences between 
their degrees of poverty anyways. In two interviews the informants found a categorization 
into four groups appropriate, while two other informants sorted the households into six 
groups. One informant created eight groups. The individual groupings of the households 
were then recorded, converted into comparable scores and finally sorted according to 
natural breaks. 
The wealth ranking results are already presented at this point and not in chapter three as 
they are essential for the description of the sampling strategy in the following methods. 
The result was a list of households, in which four natural breaks were to be observed in 
the scores, providing a spectrum of five different groups (see graph 2.2.1). 
 
Graph 2.2.1 Wealth ranking results of 
Skoonheid with DRFN labels (n=74)  
23% 
46% 
18% 
9% 
4% 
Suffering: 17 households
A bit better: 34 households
Better: 13 households
Moving forward: 8 households
Stable/Grounded: 3 households
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Interestingly this corresponded with the wealth ranking that had been conducted by DRFN 
three years before (DRFN 2011: 21). Their ranking followed a similar task with six com-
munity members of Skoonheid, who were asked in a group discussion to sort a list of 58 
households into five groups which were entitled: ‘Suffering’ (for the poorest households), 
‘A bit better’, ‘Better’, ‘Moving forward’, and ‘Stable/grounded’ (for the best situated 
households). The essential differences between DRFN’s ranking and the one conducted 
for this paper were the separation of informants and the possibility to freely adjust the 
number of groups according to the informant’s perspective. The group titles of this previ-
ous ranking task by DRFN were adopted for better illustration. However, for systematic 
sampling at later research stages the two top groups were combined due to the very small 
number of households that they contained. 
The task was repeated in Drimiopsis using a list that is originally used for water revenue 
collection provided by DRFN. No official list of village households by the MLR was availa-
ble. As the number of households in Drimiopsis is too large to conduct an effective and 
informative wealth ranking for all of them (128 households according to Dirkx and Al-
weendo (2011: 8); 218 households according to the water revenue list), it was only con-
ducted in the neighborhoods of Kanyemba 
and Klein-Kanyemba with an overall 83 
households (hereinafter: ‘the Kanyembas’ 
whenever the sample population is referred 
to). For the following research tasks, in-
formants were selected from this list of 
households with only one exception. In the 
Kanyembas, the sorting tasks with the five 
informants resulted in four major groups 
(see graph 2.2.2). Therefore two DRFN 
labels had to be combined to form one: ‘A 
bit better’ and ‘Better’ became ‘(A bit) bet-
ter’. However, to avoid further complica-
tions the groups will from hereon be num-
bered from one to four with wealth group 
one (WG1) representing the poorest ‘suffer-
ing’ group and wealth group four (WG4) 
being the wealthiest. 
  
 
Graph 2.2.2 Wealth ranking results of the 
Kanyembas with adjusted DRFN labels 
(n=83)  
12% 
51% 
6% 
31% 
Suffering: 10 households
(A bit) better: 42 households
Moving forward: 5 households
Stable/Grounded: 26 households
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2.3 Open/Semi-structured interviews 
Individual viewpoints and stories are an essential part of ethnography. For gaining a first 
insight, getting more detailed explanations and generating concise and valuable quotes – 
like the one given in the thesis title – open interviewing is an appropriate tool. In this case, 
open interviewing or a semi-structured interview entails a recorded conversation without 
fixed questions and no set time frame (Bernard 2006). A list of topics served as an orien-
tation to make sure that the informants were able to produce statements on the most sali-
ent research issues. The recording devices included the voice tracer (as previously de-
scribed), my mobile phone, and a simple notepad. 
The interviews were conducted in Ju/’hoansi, Khoekhoegowab, Afrikaans and English. I 
was able to understand and conduct most interviews in the latter two languages, but it 
was inevitable to rely on the skills of my translators whatsoever. English and Afrikaans 
statements are here presented in their original wording and grammar. Afrikaans state-
ments and phrases have been translated by myself into English while the original is pre-
sented in footnotes. Whenever a statement shows grammatical errors this is due to the 
fact that all statements in English and Afrikaans and the translations from Ju/’hoansi and 
Khoekhoegowab have been presented in the way they were uttered by the informants and 
translators during the interview. 
In Skoonheid, seven interviews were conducted with twelve informants including one 
group interview with six informants. In Drimiopsis eight informants were interviewed sepa-
rately. They were interviewed in their homes or at the central points of administration and 
gathering (i.e. Skoonheid’s farm house and the office building in Drimiopsis). The first in-
terviews were conducted according to the results of the previous wealth ranking and the 
language spoken in the household. At other times, people demanded to be interviewed or 
were asked to repeat more elaborately what they had uttered at earlier informal occasions 
for recording purposes. 
Overall, Skoonheid interviews lasted much longer and were much more informative than 
the ones conducted in Drimiopsis, where some people did not even manage to say ‘yes’ 
or ‘no’ for the whole visit. While the conversations themselves offered a chance to gain 
insight into people’s lives and their stories, the transcriptions and quotes will be an illustra-
tive tool for the rest of this thesis. The ethnographer’s privilege and burden in dealing with 
interview data is the selection of valuable quotes and to keep less significant data for ar-
chival purposes only. 
All informants were ensured anonymity and therefore all names have been changed into 
more general ones that are less revealing. This is also the case for the previously used 
statements. However, in some instances reference has to be made to an informant’s offi-
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cial role (e.g. chief or chairperson) or to their background, which may lead to an identifica-
tion based on knowledge about the local hierarchies and biographies. 
 
2.4 Free-listing 
Most anthropological literature on sharing focuses on food distribution and the relations of 
property associated with food production. To find out what goods are associated to the 
cultural domain of sharing by the inhabitants of Skoonheid and the Kanyembas a free-
listing task (De Munck 2009: 47-66) was conducted with twelve informants in each loca-
tion. The 24 informants were asked to list some common goods that are being shared in 
the community. Additionally three sub-categories were offered for the case that informants 
were not able to produce more than five items: food stuffs (e.g. maize), other consumption 
goods (e.g. tobacco) and valuable assets (e.g. money or tools). The results were then 
used in the creation of a questionnaire for the following network analysis. 
 
2.5 Ego-centered Network Analysis 
To conduct a complete network analysis on sharing behavior for the whole sample popu-
lation in the given time frame was not possible. However, it was important to gather at 
least some ego-centered data to get an impression on the character of local sharing net-
works. The questionnaire was designed as a name generator (Lang & Schnegg 2002: 19) 
in which informants were asked to name persons whom they had shared certain goods 
with in a certain amount of time. In the questionnaire’s phrasing (21 questions) certain 
parameters had to be included: 
- The character of the shared goods: the questionnaire included the most popular 
goods from the previous free-listing task and additionally questions on the sharing 
of cooked food within and outside the household. Furthermore, it was based on 
theoretical considerations by Bird-David (2005), who has differentiated between 
sharing as a distribution of goods (e.g. food) and sharing as a common usage of 
an indivisible good (e.g. garden tools or livestock). 
- The role of short-term reciprocity: the questionnaire distinguished between the giv-
ing and the receiving of the shared goods. Furthermore, it referred to sharing oc-
currences “within the last two days” for regularly shared goods (e.g. maize, phone 
credit) or “recently” for goods of seasonal character (e.g. tools, garden harvest). 
- The role of in-group versus out-group sharing: the informants were asked about 
their relationship to the persons that they named. As a distinction based on lan-
guage or ethnicity was not appropriate in this case, the dichotomy of family versus 
neighbor was introduced. Both San and Damara have complex kinship systems, 
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but in this case only a differentiation based on English family terms was conduct-
ed.  
The following factors played a role in the sampling process: 
- Two places of living (Skoonheid and the Kanyembas) 
- Two time frames (two days before and after pension pay-out day) 
- Four contrast groups (San versus Non-San; Pension versus No pension) 
- Four wealth groups (The top two groups in Skoonheid combined) 
These sampling factors add up to 32 questionnaire participants as presented in the chart 
below (2.5.1). In three cases, however, no household with the needed characteristics was 
available, so that the most similar available household from a neighboring wealth group 
was selected. The questionnaire was available in English and Afrikaans and the programs 
that were applied during the analysis were Stata/IC 12.0, MS Excel 2003 and Excel 2013. 
 
Wealth 
group 
Skoonheid The Kanyembas 
Before pen-
sion payout 
After pension  
payout 
Before pension 
payout 
After pension  
payout 
San 
Non-
San Pension 
No Pen-
sion San 
Non-
San Pension 
No Pen-
sion 
WG1 2C 5C 5F 3H D8 E1 D3 C7 
WG2 5A 5D 5H 5G 
C6, 
E3 A1 B1, E2 B4 
WG3 4G N/A 2B 5I N/A D1 N/A E4 
WG4 5E 4A, 5B 3G 4C E5 D9 E7 E6 
Chart 2.5.1 Distribution of households in the network sample 
 
2.6 Statement-Agreement Survey 
As a result of previous observations, a questionnaire was developed, which offered 37 
statements to overall 80 informants (40 per resettlement farm) and asked them to indicate 
to what extent they agree with them. For this purpose a Likert scale was applied with five 
different options to choose from, which did not present noteworthy difficulties to the trans-
lators and the informants: 
- 1: Fully disagree / Stem glad nie saam nie = 0% agreement 
- 2: Disagree / Stem nie saam nie = 25% agreement 
- 3: Undecided / Nutraal = 50% agreement 
- 4: Agree / Stem saam = 75% agreement 
- 5: Fully agree / Stem heeltemal saam = 100% agreement 
The statement items were grouped into three sections: 
Personal property vs. common good: most researchers in hunter-gatherer studies see a 
strong link between a different definition of property and more extensive sharing practices, 
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which can be linked with differing definitions of theft. In this context items involving the 
taking without permission of goods with different physical closeness (e.g. stocked food vs. 
garden vegetables) and different value (e.g. milk vs. meat) were presented to the inform-
ants. The list of goods was partly based on the free-listing results and the earlier conduct-
ed network analysis. This was combined with the family versus neighbor dichotomy which 
had previously been applied in the analysis of the network questionnaires and proved 
suitable. This formed the following statement frame for the first ten items: “If F/N10 takes 
my X without permission, that person is a thief.” 
Sharing obligation and reciprocity: this section was also based on the family versus 
neighbor dichotomy. The first eight items (11-18) asked the informants to indicate to what 
extent they felt obliged to share a certain good when being asked by a family member or 
neighbor (“When F/N asks me for X, I feel obliged to share with him/her.”). The other eight 
items (19-26) then asked to what extent the informants expected to get something in re-
turn for helping that person (“If I share X with F/N, I expect that person to help me in the 
future.”). The phrasing of these items proved to be a problem during the interview pro-
cess. Some informants interpreted “expect” as normative while others saw it more from an 
empirical perspective. This aspect will be discussed more elaborately in chapter three.  
Economic self-perception: items 27-30 asked the informants about direct economic be-
havior (long-term planning and work effort) with an indirect relation to sharing while items 
31-37 offered different explanations for personal economic failure (“I struggle in life, be-
cause…”). This last part of the questionnaire was less informative about sharing itself, but 
more a snapshot of general perceptions of the world and will not be discussed in this the-
sis. 
                                                           
10
 F = a family member; N = a neighbor. 
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3. Results and Discussion 
At this point a working definition of the term ‘norm’ or ‘social norm’ is inevitable. Although it 
may not be explicitly applied in all subsequent sections it forms the basis of analysis in all 
of them. Gerd Spittler’s work on “Norm und Sanktion” from 1967 may be somewhat out-
dated due to other more recent publications on the topic of social norms, but it constitutes 
a good introduction to a timeless issue in the definition process whatsoever: the term 
‘norm’ has been subject to many different definitions with varying foci depending on the 
context it is used in. Spittler describes three different viewpoints of definition (1967: 9-15): 
“Norm als Verhaltensgleichförmigkeit”11: In this case norms are seen as shared frames of 
reference within a certain cultural group. They depend on observed regularities in the 
opinion of the majority. They may also be defined as ‘customs’ as long as deviant opinions 
are not frowned upon by other group members. As soon as controlling mechanisms such 
as sanctions are applied the majority opinion is defined as ‘norm’. 
“Norm als Verhaltensforderung”12: A norm-sender demands that the norm-receiver behave 
in a certain way. In this case, the regularity or uniformity of behavior as defined above is 
only a result of the demand. It is important that sender and receiver are known for the 
norm to be of a certain value. As soon as sender and receiver are known the validity of 
the demand may be reassessed. 
“Norm als Verhaltensberwertung”13: Before a demand can be made, members of a group 
must evaluate a certain behavior and find it to be acceptable or appropriate. Norms are 
associated with a corresponding value. It is important to note that a certain way of behav-
ior may be regarded as valuable, but may not be consistent with the two previous defini-
tion viewpoints (e.g. civil disobedience against an oppressive state). 
In his study, Spittler decides to assign the term ‘norm’ to the second definition. Uniformity 
of behavior he defines as ‘custom’ and the evaluation of behavior as “Bewertungsstand-
ard”14 as long as it is shared by large group. This definition viewpoint has also been ap-
plied in the analysis for this thesis for three reasons. First, the sharing of food and money 
is not unique to hunter-gatherers and can be observed with certain regularity in every cul-
ture (e.g. donations at Christmas time). Therefore, it would be difficult to justify research 
on sharing norms among the San if they were defined as observed regularities, observa-
ble in any other society. Second, although Wiessner claims that Ju/’hoansi sharing is not                                                            
11
 Norm as uniformity of behavior 
12
 Norm as demanding of behavior 
13
 Norm as evaluation of behavior 
14
 Standard of evaluation 
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based on demand (2005: 123) I choose to agree with Widlok, who claims that “in a certain 
sense there is no sharing without a demand” (2013: 21). Therefore norm-sender and 
norm-receiver are inevitable components of sharing norms. Thirdly, as pointed out in the 
introductory chapter, sharing and especially demand sharing may occur without the norm-
sender’s awareness of it as a leveling-mechanism of an egalitarian ideology. Furthermore, 
sharing obligation may constitute impairment to long-term planning in agriculture. This 
leads to the conclusion that an evaluation process may not necessarily take place.  
According to Spittler, the main prerequisite for a demand to be defined as a norm are 
sanctioning mechanisms (1967: 19). It is, however, important to keep the difference in 
mind between a simple disadvantage of not complying with a custom and the proactive 
sanction by community members upon norm infringement: “Sanktionen sind Reaktionen 
auf Abweichungen von Verhaltensregelmäßigkeiten, durch die demonstriert wird, daß das 
abweichende Verhalten nicht hingenommen wird.” (ibid: 23). This definition leads back to 
the argument on reciprocity in hunter-gatherer societies. If the motivation to share was 
simply based on reciprocity, sharing would have to be defined as a custom. In a custom, 
the share-giver weighs the concrete economic advantages and disadvantages of adhering 
to the custom of sharing and therefore will be unlikely to share with a person that is unable 
to reciprocate sooner or later. This is especially the case if every sharing demand is 
judged separately according to its usefulness. For the case of sharing norms, however, 
the reciprocity factor is weakened as the share-giver has to fear sanctions by the share-
demanders in a case of non-compliance with these norms. These can also be intensified if 
the norm is breached repeatedly: “Der Unterschied zwischen Norm und Brauch besteht 
also darin, daß im ersten Fall eine Verletzung nicht hingenommen wird, sondern, daß man 
mit weiteren, wahrscheinlich schärferen Mitteln versucht, die Norm durchzusetzen, wäh-
rend das beim Brauch nicht der Fall ist“ (ibid.). 
Now the question may arise: Why it is so important to explicitly distinguish between shar-
ing norms and sharing customs? On the one hand, it is linked to the academic discussion 
on hunter-gatherer reciprocity as explained above. On the other, normative behavior plays 
an important role in contexts of social cooperation such as the presented field setting. This 
becomes very clear in the norm definition that Lesorogol has offered: 
Norms are shared beliefs about appropriate behavior held in a particular group or 
community. […] In other words, repeated patterns of behavior create expectations 
about future behavior and ensure a degree of predictability in social relations. […] 
When norms are unclear or when there is widespread violation of normative be-
havior, others’ actions become less predictable and cooperation more difficult to 
establish or maintain. […] Norms are enforced by sanctions of violations as well as 
rewards for behavior consistent with norms. In this way they play an important part 
in regulating individual behavior. (2007: 921). 
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In this chapter, different aspects of sharing are discussed. First, it is important to define 
what people in Skoonheid and the Kanyembas associate with the act of sharing and how 
this is related to their identity. Secondly, to what extent the image of sharing corresponds 
with actual behavior needs to be assessed. This is followed by three sections that discuss 
mechanisms, which are part of the sharing process (demand, avoidance, sanction). The 
final two sections of this chapter discuss the economic consequences that sharing norms 
may have and the role that inter-ethnic communication plays in this context. All these is-
sues were not only examined under the sometimes problematic San versus Non-San di-
chotomy. Differences according to age, place of living, and wealth were also taken into 
account with regard to the gathered qualitative and quantitative data. 
 
3.1 The Emic Discourse: What is Sharing and Where Does It Come From? 
From an academic perspective the starting point for the analysis of the sharing discourse 
among the San is often based on the reports of John and Lorna Marshall, who: 
“reported that a kill of 15-18 large mammals per year was usual for a single 
Ju/’hoan band. Averaging 25 people per band […]. When an animal was killed, its 
owner had the right to distribute the meat. Without fail, meat was shared with virtu-
ally all members of the local group, along rather definite lines of sharing. Even 
those who might never have primary access to meat with which to reciprocate at a 
later date […] were given their shares. Certainly, the distribution of meat was a 
point of high tension in Ju/’hoan and all San societies: if anyone were to be left out, 
a great deal of bad feeling would result.” (Biesele & Hitchcock 2011: 51). 
At this point, however, solely the emic discourse will be presented. Apart from academic 
considerations, which will remain of importance in the following sections, this part is con-
cerned with the cultural domain that the people of Skoonheid and the Kanyembas have 
constructed around sharing: “cultural domain analysis – the study of the content and struc-
ture of shared beliefs about areas of culture” (Bernard et al. 2009: 189). At this point shar-
ing is solely analyzed as a discursive construct: “Cultural domains are part of emic culture, 
so the study of those domains is necessarily about what people think they do – or what 
they think others do or might do – not what they do” (ibid.). To find out how sharing is con-
structed in Skoonheid and the Kanyembas data from three field methods is relevant. In-
terview statements are presented and then enriched by the results of free-listing and the 
statement-agreement survey. 
 
Whenever Wilma J., an elderly Damara lady, talks about the times before Drimiopsis her 
face starts to light up. In the “good old days” she lived together with her mother and grand-
father on a farm close to Gobabis working as a housemaid. She describes how her family 
never suffered from hunger and how they did not have to worry about the next day. How-
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ever, the farm owner passed away and his children sold the farm to an investor from Bot-
swana, who had no need for Wilma and her family. That is how she ended up in Drimiop-
sis. When asked in what year she had to leave the farm she looks down and scratches 
her head. She does not remember if it was 1998 or 2008 and explains that she never went 
to school and that she is too old to remember years. Today, she owns one of those many 
small allotments in Drimiopsis with a house made from corrugated iron. Some of her chil-
dren and other relatives live in the same neighborhood while others stay at a neighboring 
farm or in Gobabis. Her husband passed away some years ago and so did two of her 
seven children. When she talks about her grandchildren she is proud of the fact that she is 
not able to count them all. She earns a living by preparing snacks (padkos) for school 
children and doing house work for her neighbors. 
When people in Drimiopsis or Skoonheid are asked to tell a bit about their life before the 
resettlement farm, they start with the phrase: “We came from the farm”. Wilma’s life story 
is but one of many similar ones and most of them are reduced by the story tellers them-
selves to one central message: We used to have a good life before we came here. This is 
the case for many aspects of life on the resettlement farms and although Wilma insists 
that she is a pure Damara and that her family never had anything to do with hunting and 
gathering, her romanticizing view of the past also resembles those who claim San herit-
age: 
There is more people here now, more people. They come from different areas. […] 
Life has been changed, because once they came here they wants to be like 
somebody who is now the chief, the chairpersons like that… and we the ones that 
came first they become low. It’s making life harder with them. (Magda T., 18 yrs, 
from Skoonheid). 
We are having ways to help each other, but at the same time we all are not having 
that much power. And those days we were having knowledges that built up the 
boers [lit. “farmers”, label for white Afrikaans-speaking settlers] and the boers they 
get rich and we just get poor and poor and poor. Nowadays there are no ways how 
to survive or do something. So everything we do must be under the law. We must 
not break the law, so it will be consequences to suffer. [...] The society have al-
most changed, but some did not change. Like in pos drie [“post three”, a settle-
ment 35 km to the west] the society have not change. Like those guys are still us-
ing alcohol and the self-mixtures. (Karl L., 52 yrs, from Skoonheid; through transla-
tor from Ju/’hoansi). 
Therefore, whenever I have something and somebody asks me [to share], I be-
come stingy. Then I eat alone with my children and of course I give to my mother. 
So now when you do not have anything, for example sugar, and you ask some-
body, all of them do not have sugar. But they do have it in the house and simply 
tell you they do not have. It does not work like in the old times. The current years 
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have changed, lots of change. The people do not give to each other; they eat at 
home.15 (Anja G., 24 yrs, Skoonheid). 
Although the given quotes concern different topics such as political authority, cultural 
knowledge, and solidarity, they all contain a certain degree of nostalgia. When it comes to 
sharing, however, some claim that it is not only a matter of years past, but also a current 
practice: 
We are here in Drimiopsis and the people from the farms come to us to ask for 
maize meal. Then we give it to the farm people. And the people in Gobabis are al-
so suffering; our families are there and we give them, too. When we get the maize 
meal from the government, they demand: ‘Give us, give us!’ We are just giving! 
We give them food and a good place to sleep. They sleep here and move on. Also 
country people. We are helping one another. (Carla N., 45 yrs, from Drimiopsis).16 
We, who are getting a pension, we buy our food and some small things that we 
need. That is all… for one family. Like here in my house, me and my wife get a 
pension and there is only us and the kids. […] The two of us, we help them [people 
who suffer from hunger]. If somebody asks for food, we help him. That is some-
thing that works. I think if somebody asks for some money or food, you can help. 
(Francis P., 65 yrs, from Skoonheid).17 
Interestingly, Carla has a mixed background and speaks both Khoekhoegowab and 
Ju/’hoansi at home, while Francis is definitely a Damara. This shows that the discourse on 
sharing and solidarity is not restricted to San identity, but is also part of everyday thinking 
among Non-San. Very different information was gathered in the interviewing process and 
no clear-cut tendency could be identified along identity lines. Below, the first statement 
belongs to a Damara lady while the other three have been provided by Ju/’hoansi speak-
ers: 
I have family, but they do not worry about me. Only my daughter helps me, but on-
ly for the pension. When I ask for food, nobody can help, because they have no                                                            
15
 Translated from Afrikaans: “Daarom, as ek iets het en hulle vra dan suinig ek vir hulle. Dan eet 
ek dit alleen met my kinders of ek ou my ma, is klaar. As jy miskien nou nie iets het nie, soos 
byvorbeeld as jy nie suiker het nie: jy vra by iemand, en almal hulle het nou nie suiker nie. Maar 
hulle het dit in die huis maar hulle sê vir jou sy het nie. Dit werk nie soos die ou tyd nie. So nou se 
jare is verander; daar is groot verander. Die mense ou nie mekaar nie; hulle eet net by hulle se 
huis.” 
16
 Translated from Afrikaans: “Ons is nou in Drimiopsis. Die plaas se mense kom vra hierso by ons 
mielie-meel. Dan ou ons vir die plaas se mense. En die mense in Gobabis is baie swak. Daar is 
ons se families. Ons ou hulle hierso. As ons die mielie-meel van die government kry dan vra hulle: 
‘Ou ons, ou ons!’ Ons gee net! Ons gee kos, ons gee slaapplekke mos. Hulle slap by ons en gaan 
verby. Ook buitemense! Ons help mekaar.”  
17
 Translated from Afrikaans: “Ons wat pension-mense is ons koop ons se kos en nog goedertjies 
wat ons nodig is, dis al... vir een family. Soos my huis is hier so, ek is pensionaar en my vrou is ook 
pensionaar en dit is net ons twee en ons die kinders. [...] Ons twee se kant, ons help hom! As sy 
honger kom vra, ons help hom. Dis iets wat werk. Ek dink as mens iets kom vra geld of kos, jy kan 
help.” 
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food. I ask, but nobody give me. […] The neighbors have nothing, my daughter 
has nothing, I have nothing. How can we help the others when there is nothing? 
[…] The time I come to Drimiopsis, the people share, but now it is different. The 
people are mean and cannot see. […] All things is now money, the people that 
make the garden are just selling. No trade, all cash. […] Language does not mat-
ter, everybody is alone. (Maria A., 70 yrs, from Drimiopsis, through translator from 
Khoekhoegowab)  
Relatives and neighbors help each other. They help me as well, for example when 
I want to visit someone, they always help me with the donkey-cart to go and visit. 
But it is only the families on their own; they do not work well together. The food 
from the garden we only share within the family. (Anton G., 60 yrs, Drimiopsis)18 
People here do not help me. Only at the farms I get help. They give me milk, meat, 
porridge and money. But not in Drimiopsis. I give, but others will not give. Neigh-
bors and family are coming and I help, but they do not. This is part of the life. […] 
When the Bushmen stay in a group they give for the others, but when you stay far 
you cannot get and give. (Martha S., 30 yrs, from Drimiopsis; through translator 
from Ju/’hoansi)  
Usually you cook only for your wife and the children that stay in the house. When-
ever somebody comes to visit he should not wait for food. You should give to him. 
Then you may get less as you gave to the visiting people. But with the food you 
have to ask him. If you say: ‘I have some food’, you must give him. With tea and 
coffee you ask and people say: ‘Yes, I will have some coffee.’ Then you get it for 
him. […] When you see hungry people then you say to them: ‘Do you have food?’, 
‘No, I do not.’, ‘I have some maize meal at home.’ Then you should send him some 
maize meal. That is the little bit that you can do for him. My wife and I have things 
like maize meal and sugar and tea and we give them to the people. If somebody 
has nothing, that person has nothing. If somebody has something, he helps. 
(Faustus L., 66 yrs, from Skoonheid)19 
Out of the many points that can be discussed regarding the given statements, two have to 
be noted explicitly. First, it becomes apparent that sharing is part of a discourse which 
encompasses perceptions of both the past and the present. Secondly, this discourse con-
structs sharing always in an economic context, dominated by the issue of poverty, and 
independently from its characterization in past or present terms. Sharing is mostly men-
tioned in a context of having in the past and not-having at present as shown by the exam-                                                           
18
 Translated from Afrikaans: “Die familie en die buurmense hulle help mekaar. Hulle help vir my 
ook as ek miskien will gaan kuier en ek het altyd donkeykar gevra dan kom hulle vir my gaan kuier. 
[…] Maar dis net familie, familie, familie; hulle werk nie baie saam nie. […] Ons deel die tuin kos 
net met die familie.”  
19
 Translated from Afrikaans: “As jy kook jy kook net vir jou vrou en jou kinders wat daar in die 
huisie is. As iemand kom kuier hy sal nie wag vir kos nie. Jy sal vir hom ou. Jy mag minder kry wat 
daai kuier mense gekry. Maar by die kos ook moet jy hom vra. As jy sê ‘Ek het enige kos’, dan gee 
jy vir hom. By tee en koffie jy vra, mense sê ‘Ja ek drink een koffie’, dan haal jy vir hom. [...] Waar 
jy sien die mense met die honger, dan sê jy vir hulle ‘Het jy kos?’, ‘Nee ek het nie kos nie.’, ‘Ek het 
daar by my bitjie mielie-meel’, dan kan jy vir hom bitjie miele-meel stuur. Dis bitjie wat jy kan vir 
hom maak. By goeder soos mielie-meel en suiker en tee daar het ek met my vrou, en ons ou 
mense. As iemand nie het nie, dan het daai nie. As iemand het, dan help hy.” 
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ple of Wilma J. above. People in Skoonheid and Drimiopsis are not surrounded by an en-
vironment of abundant resources but by resource scarcity and poverty and therefore 
Woodburn’s idea of sharing as a leveling-mechanism within an egalitarian ideology is in-
appropriate. When sharing becomes a means to ensure the survival of one’s own and 
befriended families it is unlikely that anything but the will to survive is the guiding principle. 
 
 
Graph 3.1.1 Free-listing results; number of participants = 24; food items in capitals 
The analysis of qualitative interviews does not suffice on its own to find out what elements 
constitute the cultural domain of sharing in Skoonheid and the Kanyembas. Of importance 
is also a definition of the shared objects. Ethnographic literature mostly focuses on the 
sharing of food, especially that of meat. In Skoonheid and Drimiopsis this is only partly the 
case (see graph 3.1.1). In total, the 24 informants mentioned 24 different items; half of 
them were food related. On average each informant listed 7.08 items (170 items in total) 
out of which 3.63 items on average (87 food items in total) were food-related (see graph 
3.1.2). While non-food items may surely also be of relevance, the term ‘sharing’ is still, to 
a somewhat greater extent, associated with food. This is supported by the observation 
that in eleven cases maize products, sugar and tea were listed together indicating an as-
sociation chain. This has not been observed for any non-food items, although one might 
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expect to find a connection between money and airtime/phone for instance. Meat only 
plays a very small role in this context compared to other food items such as maize 
products and sugar. I was assured by sev-
eral informants that meat is among the least 
shared food stuffs in both Skoonheid and 
Drimiopsis. 
 
As mentioned in 2.5, Bird-David has point-
ed out two different meanings of ‘to share’ 
in the English language: “The first stresses 
a division of things between individuals, the 
second the joining of individuals in common 
action, experience, or usage.” (2005: 203). 
The listed food items are surely being di-
vided among the members of the communi-
ty although one might argue that this is 
more likely to indicate social connectedness rather than division. Phones, tools and 
transport cannot be divided and therefore force the sharers to cooperate. Both ways of 
sharing seem to be practiced in Skoonheid and the Kanyembas. 
The statement-agreement survey proved to be a suitable tool to gather quantitative data 
on the cultural domain of sharing, especially with regard to the second section on sharing 
obligation (items 11-18) and reciprocity expectations (items 19-26). Structure and wording 
of the questionnaire have been introduced in section 2.6. 
 
Graph 3.1.3 Sharing obligation (items 11-18): sorted according to ‘San versus Non-San’ 
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The results present a relatively high agreement with the offered statements throughout the 
survey, none of the average values being below 60 percent agreement for all question-
naire items. Graph 3.1.3 shows a clear tendency that informants with San identity feel 
more obliged to share certain goods than others. This is especially the case for goods that 
are to be shared beyond family lines (on average 9 percent difference between San and 
Non-San). It must be noted, however, that these differences are never larger than 11 per-
cent and that the sample size would have to be larger to make this result representative. 
Graph 3.1.4 shows that such differences also depend on the wealth of the household, 
although the result is more complex at first sight. 
 
Graph 3.1.4 Sharing obligation (items 11-18): sorted according to ‘Wealth Groups’ 
 
First, just like in graph 3.1.3 there is an overall tendency that the feeling of obligation to 
share is higher whenever it is a family member that demands a share. There are only two 
exceptions to that observation, for money and work in wealth group 4 (WG4), where the 
informants indicated that they feel more obliged to share with a neighbor than with a fami-
ly member. Both money and work cannot be consumed as food immediately, but are 
means to acquire some. It is worth the thought, but not more than that, to take into ac-
count that goods of immediate use, such as food items or tobacco are of higher sharing 
value than those that require at least one other step to be turned into hunger relief. This 
could be an indicator for immediate-return values, but requires further research, as an 
argument on the present data would be too vague. 
Second, the largest differences in agreement are found with regard to sharing money with 
a neighbor (30% difference between WG1 and WG4) and helping him with garden work 
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(19% difference between WG2 and WG4). It can be observed that different goods cause 
different sharing obligations, which is very likely to depend on the household’s economic 
situation rather than their ethnic identity. People from poor households will feel less 
obliged to share the little that they have than those who are comparatively richer. 
In questionnaire items 19-26 the informants were asked to indicate to what degree they 
expect a person to return a favor (“If I share X with F/N, I expect that person to help me in 
the future.”). However, as already mentioned in 2.6, I noticed too late that this phrasing 
was problematic because the word ‘expect’ made two different interpretations possible: a 
normative one (Expectation: the demand to reciprocate based on an assured system of 
shared values) and an empirical one (Expectancy: the likelihood to reciprocate based on 
the personal feeling about previous behavior of a person). Yet these two different interpre-
tations may be integrated in a system of argument with the data on the informants’ feeling 
of obligation to share (items 11-18). Starting with the knowledge that the overall feeling of 
obligation to share generated high agreement values, three explanations appear plausi-
ble: 
1. Altruistic motives based on a certain ethic (e.g. Woodburn’s egalitarianism) 
2. Normative expectations for a return (demanding reciprocity) 
3. Empirical expectancy of a return (calculated likeliness of reciprocity) 
In the first case one can hypothesize that the informant will indicate a higher value for 
questionnaire items 11-18 than for items 19-26 as reciprocal factors should not play a role 
if sharing behavior is based on ethic principles. The latter two explanations are based on 
Sahlins’ assumption that generally an unspecified return is expected by the share giver 
(Bird-David 2005: 202). If an individual’s feeling of obligation to share depends on norma-
tive expectations of reciprocity, it is unlikely that the economically thinking individual will 
indicate a lower value for items 19-26 than for 11-18. This is also the case, if an individu-
al’s feeling of obligation to share depends on empirical expectancy of a return, although in 
this case the causal chain is reversed. In the case of normative expectation the willing-
ness to share precedes the expectation to receive something in return, while in the other 
case empirical expectancy entails the willingness to share. 
While the San of Skoonheid and the Kanyembas indicated a higher feeling of obligation to 
share than their Non-San neighbors for all goods and share demanders (3.1.3), reciprocity 
expectations/expectancy are not as obvious (3.1.5). What remains stable is the strong 
differentiation between family members and non-related neighbors. Here we find that re-
turn expectations are generally lower for neighbors than for family members, which would 
not be the case if sharing was solely constructed around reciprocal principles. For more 
easily accessible share items such as tobacco and work the San seem to be more gener-
ous and seem to have higher return expectations as well. Sharing of food within the family 
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seems to raise no different points of view when it comes to San or Non-San identity and 
remains the category with the highest agreement rate. 
 
Graph 3.1.5 Return expectancy/ reciprocity likelihood: sorted according to ‘San versus Non-
San’ 
 
 
Graph 3.1.6 Return expectancy / reciprocity likelihood: sorted according to ‘wealth group’ 
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ences between the groups themselves no significant differences or tendencies can be 
observed except for the fact that WG1 and WG2 indicate the highest agreement rate 
whenever the family is concerned. 
Responding to the three hypotheses which were developed above in order to solve the 
questionnaire wording dilemma, graph 3.1.7 combines the previous four graphs. The av-
erage agreement values on items 11-18 have been subtracted from the values of ques-
tionnaire items 19-26 for the four wealth groups and the two identity groups. It shows that 
in the majority of cases return expectations were lower than the feeling of obligation to 
share, which indicates that people construct their willingness to share in most cases 
around ethic motives such as solidarity and family cohesion. A significantly higher expec-
tation/expectancy of receiving help in return for sharing was only indicated by WG1 when 
food had been shared with the family and by WG2, WG3, and the Non-San group in mat-
ters of sharing money. Surely this can be explained by the high significance that food has 
for the very poor people and the overall concreteness of value that money inhibits. WG4 is 
the only group that indicates lower return expectancy in all categories and seems to be 
the most altruistic with overall 120 percentage points of negative difference, followed by 
the San (73) and WG3 (68). This is remarkable in as far as WG3 and WG4 contain 10 
San and 16 Non-San households, showing that both wealth and identity are values that 
need to be taken into account separately in the assessment of sharing, reciprocity and the 
underlying motives. 
 
Graph 3.1.7 Values of items 19-26 were subtracted from the values in the corresponding 
category in items 11-18; values for wealth and identity groups 
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As a preliminary conclusion the following points can be made: 
- The food sharing discourse is closely connected to the discourse on the past and 
the current poverty issues. 
- Although other (less dividable) goods may also be shared, sharing is mostly asso-
ciated with food. 
- Both groups construct sharing as a non-reciprocal activity based on ethic values. 
- Differences in the sharing discourse can both be explained with regard to identity 
and economic factors.  
 
3.2 Data on Actual Behavior: What is the Role of Reciprocity and Moral Economy? 
They [other San] do not share and only eat with their family. The little that people 
give to me I only give to my child and I sleep with hunger. There is nobody who 
shares with you in this place. But when you have something you give when they 
ask. It is hard in this place.20  (Anja G., 24 yrs, Skoonheid) 
After describing how the inhabitants of Skoonheid and the Kanyembas use the idea of 
sharing as a discursive tool, the important question arises to what extent sharing can be 
seen as an actually practiced norm in this context. However, three theoretical assump-
tions need to be clarified a bit more explicitly in order to answer this question. 
First, Spittler (1967: 18) notes that surveys, which ask the respondents how one ought to 
behave in a certain situation, may not tell to what extent the described norms are actually 
being practiced by them. This is especially the case if the individual’s evaluation of the 
norm differs from society’s demand. Thus, not every verbal demand for normative behav-
ior can be regarded as an actual social norm, especially if it is merely applied as a discur-
sive construct. In this case the survey data from the statement-agreement questionnaire 
needs to be enriched by empirical observations and quantitative data from the ego-
centered network analysis asking for information on actual behavior. 
Secondly, it is important to differentiate between food-sharing networks and gift-giving 
networks. Although these two systems may be inevitably linked when it comes to issues of 
food security they will be analyzed separately at this point. This is partly done to add fur-
ther perspectives on the reciprocity argument and also to confine the categories of food 
                                                           
20
 Translated from Afrikaans: “Hulle deel nie, hulle eet net met die huisgesin. Die bietjie wat iemand 
vir my ou, gee ek maar net vir my kind en ek slaap maar net so met die honger. Daar is niemand 
wat vir ‘n mens ou hierso. Maar as jy het dan ou jy as hulle vra. Dis baie moeilik hierso.” 
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and non-food items in the free-listing task. Wiessner’s observations of the !Kung21 hxaro 
system are usually embedded in the discussion of environmental influences on the cultur-
al systems and the sharing ethos of hunter-gatherers, which has been briefly described in 
the introductory chapter of this thesis. As hxaro she describes a gift-giving system, which 
establishes and maintains social bonds between individuals within and outside a camp of 
foragers: 
Through a system of mutual reciprocity called hxaro, the !Kung San organize 
themselves in such a way that each family creates ties which distribute its risk over 
the population and thereby assure that losses will be covered in bad years. […] 
The hxaro relationship involves a balanced, delayed exchange of gifts, whose con-
tinuous flow gives both partners information about the underlying status of the rela-
tionship – one of a bond of friendship accompanied by mutual reciprocity and ac-
cess to resources. In addition, each partnership links a person to a broad network 
of hxaro paths. (Wiessner 1982: 66). 
The definition of hxaro as a reciprocal system and the observation that “[g]ifts for hxaro 
can be any non-food items” (ibid: 70) are the first indicators that sharing and gift-giving are 
to be analyzed separately. Results from Skoonheid and the Kanyembas showed that food 
items are associated slightly more often with the act of sharing and that reciprocal expec-
tations – may they be based on normative or empirical notions – are generally weaker 
than the feeling of obligation to share. Furthermore, Wiessner has observed that an ex-
change of goods upon demand does only very seldom occur and that a “gift is private 
property for as long as a person wishes to keep it” (ibid.). This contrasts the leveling-
mechanisms that Woodburn has described, indicating that food-sharing and hxaro may 
have different origins. In a subsequent discussion Wiessner also supports the separate 
analysis of hxaro networks and food sharing due to differing social densities: 
Comparison of the hxaro network with webs of food sharing would almost certainly 
yield different densities. Hxaro builds sparse networks to allow people to redistrib-
ute themselves over the resources of the region; ties of food sharing create com-
munity among people living in one place–both residents and visitors–and are 
dense within a given location. (Wiessner 1998: 515). 
In this case the two systems constitute similar means to different ends. While food sharing 
may function as leveling-mechanism and as catalyst for group identity, hxaro and poten-
tially other gift-giving systems serve as a response mechanism to ecological uncertainties. 
Furthermore, food sharing must be labeled ‘immediate-return’, while hxaro can be regard-                                                           
21
 !Kung and Ju/’hoansi both belong to the Kx’a language family and the Northern Khoisan dialect 
cluster (Dieckmann et al. 2014: 23). Their names are often used interchangeably by authors like 
Wiessner (2005). 
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ed as a ‘delayed-return’ strategy as it is unusual to reciprocate immediately after the re-
ception of a gift (ibid.). To separate food-sharing observations from gift-giving observa-
tions may be one approach that can reconcile the two opposing perspectives in the reci-
procity discussion. 
There is sharing without the motive to give—and, conversely, the motive to give 
exists without it being sharing, most prominently in gift-giving. This makes a sim-
plistic explanation of why people share even less convincing when conceived of as 
reciprocal exchange and it makes sharing an even greater challenge to an emerg-
ing anthropological theory of value. (Widlok 2013: 12). 
Surely there are significant differences due to varying historical trajectories between 
Wiessner’s descriptions of the !Kung hxaro and the kinship-based exchange systems of 
the Omaheke San (Sylvain 2003: 116). However, as shown in the previous section, 
hunter-gatherer identity remains a strong discursive force in Skoonheid and Drimiopsis 
and is inevitably linked to the culture of other San groups. 
The third theoretical approach that needs to be taken into account for the analysis of ac-
tual sharing practices is related to hxaro, but needs some more explicit elaboration to 
reach its final argument. Wiessner’s characterization of hxaro as a “product of a structured 
set of social relations” (1982: 61) links it with the discussion of moral economy (Bollig 
1998: 138). Moral economy has been redefined several times by different scholars in the 
past decades and the academic debate has confronted its students with a puzzling num-
ber of definitions which are apparently all outdated. Short summaries on this topic have 
been provided by Peterson (2002) and Berzborn (2004: 9-11). Basically, the term ‘moral 
economy’ or ‘economy of affection’ (Lemarchand 1989) refers to the assumption that eco-
nomic decisions within kinship groups are based on moral obligations of subsistence pro-
vision rather than on rational choice: “Dabei wird eine Dichotomie erzeugt, die das Eigen-
interesse des rationalen Akteurs in der marktorientierten Wirtschaft den moralischen 
Verpflichtungen als entscheidendem Steuerungselement der Subsistenzökonomie 
gegenüberstellt.” (Berzborn 2004: 9). Bollig among others has, however, observed that 
kinship systems do not necessarily constitute an economic disadvantage. A moral econ-
omy based on far-reaching kinship-networks may very well be a “product of self-interest 
and rational interaction” (1998: 154) as long as moral obligations are based on reciprocal 
principles. This is also the case for hxaro, in which people often chose their gift-exchange 
partners according to the resources available in their area and the exchange partner’s 
character. A hxaro relationship may also be ended if it turns out to be not reciprocal for 
one of the partners. In other words: „We can conclude that the crucial effect of morality is 
long term reciprocity and that the long term effect is achieved because it is not reciprocity 
which is the motive but morality.” (Bloch in Berzborn 2004: 10). The question now arises: 
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why would ‘moral economy’ be of any interest to this thesis, now that the reciprocity factor 
has been eliminated by separating gift-giving from food-sharing? The answer is quite 
clear: food-sharing in Skoonheid and the Kanyembas may not only be of relevance among 
common relatives with strong moral obligations, but also beyond the family line. The anal-
ysis of the statement-agreement questionnaire has shown that people construct sharing 
as a non-reciprocal activity. Therefore it needs to be assessed whether sharing within the 
family and outside the family shows different degrees of a moral economy mindset. In this 
case, the factor of relatedness plays the most important role when comparing network 
data and looking for reciprocal relationships.  
Putting the points made above in a nutshell the following questions need to be asked for 
the subsequent discussion: Does the data from the ego-centered network analysis mirror 
the emic perspective on sharing? Is food-sharing less reciprocal than non-food sharing 
and at which point is a relationship reciprocal? Is there a difference between sharing with 
a family member and a neighbor with regard to a moral economy that is based on recipro-
cal networks? 
Before discussing these questions, the most noteworthy results from the network analysis 
are presented. In the analysis of the quantitative network data (details on questionnaire 
setup and sampling in 2.5) a summary was produced by calculating the average amount 
of sharing instances that the informants mentioned in the survey. Out of the goods men-
tioned in the questionnaire, four analytical categories were developed: 
- cooked food: questionnaire items 2-3 
- unprocessed food: questionnaire items 4-9 (maize, sugar, tea, coffee, vegetables) 
- separable non-food: questionnaire items 10-13, 16-17 and 20-21 (airtime, tobacco, 
money, other) 
- inseparable non-food: questionnaire items 14-15, 18-21 (tools, transport, other) 
These categories were combined with four other elements denoting the kind of sharing 
action: 
- giving to a family member (g_f) 
- giving to a neighbor (g_n) 
- receiving from a family member (r_f) 
- receiving from a neighbor (r_n) 
Having thus created 16 variables it was possible to calculate a total average for the corre-
sponding answers of the 32 informants (see graph 3.2.1) and also to sort them according 
to identity, wealth, place of living, and the receiving of governmental monthly pensions. 
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Graph 3.2.1 Total results of network analysis; average calculated by dividing total number of 
sharing instances through number of informants (n=32); yellow: g_f (10.9375), red: g_n 
(3.0625), blue: r_f (4.28125), green: r_n (2.40625) 
 
A two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test on Stata/IC12.0 was conducted, which indicated 
the probability (p) that the shown result is coincidental. Unfortunately, only a few statisti-
cally significant (p < 0.05) differences between the contrast groups were found. Graphs 
3.2.2 and 3.2.3 are indicating the complete results sorted according to identity group. Only 
three variables have, however, produced significant results (i.e. cooked_g_f, unpro-
cessed_g_f, and inseparable_g_n) and were marked by an asterisk. While both San and 
Non-San indicated high willingness to share food with their family members (graph 3.1.3), 
graph 3.2.2 indicates that San tend to share significantly more food with their family mem-
bers than Non-San. However, this merely means that San households are larger than 
those of Non-San22, which can have multiple reasons, but surely a willingness to share is 
mandatory in such large households. It needs to be noted that two Non-San mentioned                                                            
22
 Question two of the network questionnaire asked people to indicate how many people were eat-
ing at their fireplace on a regular basis, which is indirectly referring to the household size. San 
households in this sample hold 8.1 people while Non-San consist of 4.9 people on average. 
Skoonheid households have 5.6 people and households in the Kanyembas 7.4 people on average, 
which roughly corresponds with the findings of Dirkx & Alweendo who counted 4.6 people in 
Skoonheid and 6.5 in Drimiopsis households in 2011 (2012: 8-9). 
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people outside of the family as recipients of cooked food (cooked_g_n) while this was not 
the case for the San. 
 
Graph 3.2.2 average number of food sharing instances, sorted by identity. Tested for signif-
icance with Wilcoxon rank-sum test, marked with asterisk if p < 0.05 and therefore signifi-
cant 
 
 
Graph 3.2.3 average number of food sharing instances, sorted by identity. Tested for rele-
vance with Wilcoxon rank-sum test, marked with asterisk if p < 0.05 and therefore signifi-
cant. Please note the change of scale on the left. 
 
In the case of unprocessed food the San group stated significantly more sharing incidenc-
es than the Non-San group, too, which can again be explained by larger household sizes, 
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cated a higher number of sharing incidences of unprocessed food with people outside of 
the family. However, there is a 15 percent (p = 0.15) chance that this result is coincidental. 
Only one further variable yielded a result with a significant difference between the two 
identity-based groups. That is the case for inseparable_g_n where the Non-San on aver-
age mentioned one sharing incidence for tools, transport or another inseparable good, 
while almost none was mentioned by the San. 
Since several results showed no significant differences, only the ones with p being below 
0.05 in the mentioned significance test are illustrated beyond this point. Graph 3.2.4 
shows that only four out of the 16 variables produced significant differences between the 
informants’ wealth groups. Interestingly the household size seems to yield no significant 
differences between the wealth groups (WG1=5.4; WG2= 7.3; WG3=8.3; WG4=5.223). 
The results for unpro-
cessed_g_f roughly 
mirror the results for 
willingness to share 
food with the family in 
graph 3.1.4. This indi-
cates a certain corre-
spondence between 
sharing discourse and 
actual behavior with 
regard to the individu-
al’s wealth. Further-
more, the data on 
wealth groups indicates 
that very poor house-
holds (WG1) seem to 
be badly connected as recipients of help from others. It is not surprising that they were not 
able to state giving instances of inseparable goods as tools and transport are almost by 
definition not available to members of WG1. 
 
Surprisingly, the highest amount of statistically significant results was found through the 
comparison of Skoonheid and the Kanyembas. As shown in graph 3.2.5, eight variables 
produced significant differences between the two places. People in Skoonheid seem to                                                            
23
 Wilcoxon Rank-sum test for the two groups with the largest difference: p (WG3, WG4) = 0.1532 
 
Graph 3.2.4 Significant results (Wilcoxon rank-sum, p < 0.05) for 
wealth groups 
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have more elaborated relationships with their neighbors, while people in the Kanyembas 
seem to share mostly within the family. This can partly be explained by the different 
household sizes as mentioned above. Another explanation would be the better infrastruc-
tural connectedness of Drimiopsis, which is closer to Gobabis and lies next to a tar road. 
Skoonheid lies rather isolated with only few larger settlements around. In Drimiopsis it is 
possible to borrow tools at the administration office while Skoonheid people have to help 
one another with tools. This makes inseparable goods such as transport and tools more 
likely to be exchanged beyond family lines in Skoonheid. In the Kanyembas there seems 
to be a more intense exchange of unprocessed food between family members than in 
Skoonheid, both on the giving and the receiving side. More people in the village and a 
better connectedness with other settlements usually mean more family members around 
who give and receive a share. Regarding separable goods it was observed that half of the 
people (6 out of 12) in the Kanyembas mentioned tobacco as an often shared good (graph 
3.1.1), but only three of them (3 out of 16) mentioned tobacco sharing instances in the 
network analysis. 
 
Graph 3.2.5 Significant results (Wilcoxon rank-sum, p < 0.05) sorted by place of living 
 
Age may play a role when it comes to sharing behavior. This can be examined by compar-
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in the data. Even after comparing money exchanges separately and only for pension re-
ceivers after pension payout day, no significant difference was found between San and 
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after. Surely, researchers with the resources and time to conduct a complete network 
analysis with a representative sample size would be able to give a more sophisticated and 
detailed account of the consequences of pension payouts in former hunter-gatherer com-
munities. 
Returning to the guiding questions from this section’s beginning: Does the factual network 
data mirror the emic discourse on sharing, especially with regard to the informants’ identi-
ty (San vs. Non-San)? Is non-food sharing more reciprocal? Does reciprocity differ with 
regard to stronger or weaker moral attachment, inside and outside the family?  
Of course, all informants mentioned someone that they had sharing relationships with, but 
the networks reveal a large variety. On average each respondent mentioned 20.69 shar-
ing instances with great differences in network size: ranging between 4 and 57 mentioned 
sharing instances. Although the informants indicated that their feeling of obligation to 
share was somewhat smaller when a neighbor was concerned (see section 3.1) related-
ness seems to be a much stronger factor with regard to actual behavior. People are not as 
altruistic as they claim to be as sharing is mostly practiced within the family, especially by 
the San. The numbers reveal that most San seem to focus on their own family, while most 
Non-San also extend their sharing networks to befriended neighbors (graph 3.2.2 and 
3.2.3). This is partly due to the differing family sizes, although there are large families 
among the Non-San as well, but they integrate non-related people in their sharing network 
whatsoever. It remains unclear what the result had been if Herero, Damara, Wambo and 
Afrikaaner identity were assessed separately in the region. 
Graph 3.2.1 indicates that 10.94 of the average 20.69 referred to g_f instances, meaning 
that in more than half of the cases (53 percent) people gave something to one of their 
family members. The household size is a crucial factor in the assessment of sharing prac-
tices. Another 21 percent referred to r_f instances while g_n and r_n together make up 
merely 26 percent. This may also have practical reasons: for one, people within the family 
are more easily remembered when informants have to recall their sharing partners. Sec-
ond, informants tend to tell more about the help that they give to others than about the 
moments when they needed the help of another person: “Those people never remember 
when I help them, but they annoy me about the few times I need their help” (Gustav S., 46 
yrs, from Skoonheid). This could be an indicator for a social anti-arrogance protection 
mechanism (Lee 1969), referred to in the conclusion. 
The network data on actual sharing practice confirms certain points from the sharing dis-
course, especially the connectedness to food and the relatively high amount of sharing 
connections by its entire members. With regard to the cultural domain it has shown that 
food items (cooked and unprocessed) remain the most frequently shared, especially with 
regard to the number of sharing partners. Non-food items such as tobacco and phone 
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credit are surely also part of the sharing network, but food, due to its obvious importance 
to survival, remains most frequently shared across all identity and wealth groups. 
Interestingly, the comparison of wealth groups produced more significant differences than 
the comparison of identities. This might make sense as the ability to share or the necessi-
ty to demand a share obviously depends on wealth, especially for WG1 which stated rela-
tively few sharing instances, but indicated a relatively high willingness to share with others 
(except for money). Furthermore, the place of living plays a very important role, because 
the most significant differences in the number of sharing instances were found comparing 
Skoonheid and the Kanyembas while the analysis of the statement-agreement question-
naire had yielded no spectacular differences with regard to the two places. 
As to the degree of reciprocity of non-food items and exchanges outside of the family the 
following has to be noted. Reciprocity is a complicated issue as it is connected to time. 
Most of the questionnaire items referred to sharing instances in the last two days and 
therefore it is very well possible that reciprocal relationships were not detected. However, 
four individual examples (graphic 3.2.6) may show the different kinds of sharing relation-
ship and the degrees of reciprocity that exist. 
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Graphic 3.2.6 Individual networks of four informants: C7 (Ju/’hoansi speaking, female, WG1, 
30 yrs, Drimiopsis), A1 (Khoekhoegowab speaking, female, WG2, 33yrs, Drimiopsis), 5F 
(Ju/’hoansi speaking, female, WG1, 63 yrs, Skoonheid), 2B (Khoekhoegowab speaking, 
male, WG3, 48 yrs, Skoonheid); blue circles indicate alteri that do not live in one of the re-
settlements; orange circles indicate alteri that have been illustrated twice due to the graph-
ic’s design; thicker arrows indicate more exchanges of goods than thinner ones (Designed 
with MS Powerpoint 2003). 
 
C7 represents a (stereo)typical San household, where many relatives are sharing food, 
tobacco and phone credit with each other. The previously mentioned waves of sharing 
that Woodburn (1982) and Bird-David (1990) among others applied in their theories can 
here be observed. Those who are provided with cooked food in the household are benefi-
ciaries of C7’s (sometimes) reciprocal relationship with other family members. However, 
not one neighbor has been mentioned as giver or receiver. This sharing network seems to 
be predominantly based on moral principles and food sharing activities. 
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A1 has a small household and therefore gets the chance to practice successful network 
building also outside of the family. She maintains the family connection to those who stay 
in a different place (alteri A1n and A1o stay in Windhoek) and has a few neighbors who 
help her out. Five alteri are givers, four of them being reciprocal and belonging to the fami-
ly. 
5F personifies the exact opposite to the previous two examples. Only six alteri are part of 
this lady’s network. She has very few family members in Skoonheid and those are mostly 
receivers. Those few relationships that may be regarded as reciprocal are not relatives of 
her. It seems that the missing connectedness to her family cannot be compensated 
through new links with the surrounding neighbors. A working moral economy does not 
exist in this example. 
2B has a successful network and may even be a better example for waves of sharing than 
C7. There are eight alteri as givers and eight alteri as receivers, three of them being can-
didates for a reciprocal relationship. Furthermore, he has both food and non-food areas 
covered with giving and reciprocating alteri, which was not the case for the two Ju/’hoansi 
speaking ladies (C7 and 5F) who seemed to miss out on the inseparable non-food sec-
tion. This may be an explanation why he was sorted into WG3 while the others are in 
WG1 and WG2. 
As graphs 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 and the network examples have shown, San tend to focus on 
sharing food and some separable non-food items with family members, which seldom 
reciprocate. Non-San and those San with few relatives, on the other hand, also take care 
of their relatives, but extend their sharing relationships to non-related people and also 
create reciprocal relationships regardless of the shared goods. This leads to three hypo-
thetical considerations: 
- San food sharing exists as a discursive construct, but starts to fall apart as an ac-
tive practice as soon as family bonds break away. Sharing of food with family 
members is mostly non-reciprocal.  
- Non-San groups are also active sharers, but they tend to be influenced by strate-
gic motives. They share also with neighbors and manage to have some reciprocal 
relationships for different kinds of goods.  
- Factors such as family size, place of living and economic situation play an even 
more important role in a person’s sharing behavior than identity based on lan-
guage. This is not to say that these factors do not influence one another. 
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3.3 Rights and Obligations: Demand Sharing, Personal Property and Tolerated 
Theft 
The argument of this thesis is based on the assumption that there is no sharing without 
demand, building on Spittler’s definition of norms as Verhaltensforderung (1967) and on 
Widlok’s observation that demand sharing is the product of social demand mechanisms 
and quasi the prototype of sharing (2013: 21). In addition, 
Woodburn (1998) argues forcefully that sharing is not a voluntary act, but that 
members of the community are expected to share, or, perhaps more adequate: 
they are expected to give if somebody asks them to share. Sharing is, for Wood-
burn, very similar to an income tax in modern societies. The individual has no 
choice: if he wants to live in the traditional society, he has to share. Within this 
context Wiessner (1982) describes how members of the !Kung face the difficult 
decision between accumulating more material goods which they highly desire on 
the one hand or remaining in the traditional society which requires them to give up 
much of the items they are able to purchase when taking on a wage-job. (Kagi 
2001: 38). 
Therefore, in statement-agreement questionnaire, items 11-18 were formulated with de-
mand being the prerequisite for a sharing action. Surely it would be interesting to rephrase 
these questionnaire items without a direct demand and present them to the people of 
Skoonheid and Drimiopsis once more. Nonetheless these questionnaire items will not be 
discussed anymore as this has been done thoroughly in section 3.1. 
However, there is room for some field observations. One time I returned to Skoonheid 
after two nights in Gobabis. My host Siyaya told me that only few hours after my departure 
for Gobabis, Uncle Samuel, an elderly well-known San gentleman had come to the door. 
He was demanding that Siyaya give him all the food I had left. His argument was that he 
was hungry, that the klein-baas24 obviously did not need his food at the moment and that 
he would surely come back with more food. Thanks to Siyaya I did not go to bed hungry 
that night. 
On a different occasion, Patrick, one of the small boys that regularly visited us saw me 
drinking tea in the morning. He came straight to me, looked me into the eye and said 
something in Ju/’hoansi and Afrikaans meaning: “What are you waiting for? I also want 
some tea!” However, when he took a sip from my cup he was totally disgusted by it be-                                                           
24
 From Afrikaans: “small boss”; the title baas is a remnant of Apartheid times, which was used by 
non-whites to address white men. Klein-baas was and continues to be used for the son of a white 
farmer, for instance. I felt very uncomfortable with this title as it was obviously due to my color of 
skin. Unfortunately, there was little chance to get rid of it and as time went by I got used to it. I 
managed to make some people use it ironically as I used to give the title baas to my host Siyaya, 
who definitely has no Afrikaaner heritage in his family. 
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cause it was lacking sugar. He was also among the kids who regularly stood in front of our 
door at lunch time. Patrick and his friend Rambo were always around as soon as Siyaya 
and I were starting a fire. The kids knew around what time we ate lunch and that we had 
an electric cooking plate inside the house. Therefore, a fire automatically implied the 
preparation of meat and the longer they stayed around to watch the meat being prepared, 
the more confident they were of receiving one or two pieces. Other children were special-
ists in running to the house entrance as soon as they heard my car approaching. They 
knew that I always had oranges with me returning from Gobabis and that I was happy to 
share them. Interestingly, these children made no effort to share the things they had just 
received. Whenever there were more kids than oranges, I had to cut them up first as a 
fight would have been unavoidable otherwise. At other occasions the hands of all present 
people, even of those who were unknown to me, were extended in demand as soon as I 
revealed the cough sweets from my pockets that I always carry with me. Physical pres-
ence as a tool of demanding, as practiced by Patrick, his friends and others, has been 
described by Widlok in the following way: 
We need to recognize that one’s mere bodily presence, underlined by addressing 
the other person in particular ways, is always a demand for being acknowledged 
as a partner, a personal being with legitimate needs. An appropriate definition of 
demand sharing is therefore much broader than the use of explicit demands such 
as “Give me . . .” leading to the appropriation of what one may think one is entitled 
to. The explicitness of the demand may differ and it may be entirely implicit (Widlok 
2013: 21). 
The disappearance of my prescription sunglasses shortly after letting Patrick stay in the 
house for a short while during a thunderstorm disturbed the friendly relationship to him 
and his friends. I was told by two Damara ladies on separate occasions that it was my 
own fault. They explained that by letting him eat with us he had become something like a 
family member. If Patrick was raised the same way they had been, everything in the 
house belonged to him as it belonged to all family members. It was absolutely legitimate 
to take the sunglasses and hide them so that I could not take them back. The same hap-
pened when an art workshop was held for Skoonheid’s women at the admin building. As 
soon as Siyaya and I had left the house teabags, matches, firewood, dishes, and cutlery 
vanished. 
Although Patrick and I reconciled after a while, these events prompted me to include a 
section on theft and personal property in the statement-agreement questionnaire to find 
out how acceptable it was to members of society (see section 2.6 for further details). This 
was also done because several people who were responsible for the gardens and for the 
herding of animals told me that theft was a big problem in Skoonheid’s society, but that it 
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was seldom punished although it significantly disturbed development. Especially in the 
gardens, theft caused a lot of resignation and disinterest. 
Regarding the significance of this topic to economic theory and its anthropological contri-
butions in the context of “The tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 1968) and the following 
responses (e.g. Ostrom 1990), only this much can be noted at this point: sharing systems 
and the definition of property rights are tightly connected, if not complements, to the exist-
ence and failure of common-pool resources (Kagi 2001: 72) such as water, gardens and 
grazing land. 
With regard to the discourse on sharing alone, the term ‘tolerated theft’ needs to be ex-
plained to illustrate how blurred the lines of definition can be when discussing (former) 
hunting and gathering societies. The concept of “tolerated theft” was developed by 
Maynard Smith & Parker (1976) and Blurton Jones (1984). It was applied in the field by 
Bird & Bird (1997) under the assumption that successful foragers will let some of their 
food be taken away “not voluntarily, but simply because defending them is too costly” 
(Kagi 2001: 38): 
If the benefits for consuming more of the resource are sharply diminishing, the fit-
ness payoffs of consuming an additional portion of food will be worth less to the 
acquirer than to an unsuccessful hunter. If unsuccessful hunters attempt to claim 
the prey, acquirers will be expected to refuse such demands until the cost of de-
fending additional calories against the demands of those who have none is greater 
than the benefit the acquirer would receive by eating or trading those extra calo-
ries. (Bird & Bird 1997: 51). 
Tolerated theft bypasses the social norms behind demand sharing. It builds on the as-
sumption that the official owner has no right to own the desired good as soon as he or she 
has no real use for it anymore. This roughly corresponds with Uncle Samuel’s demands 
for my food. The question of the extent to which the concepts of demand sharing and tol-
erated theft condition or complement each other is difficult to answer. It is also questiona-
ble whether tolerated theft must be regarded as a social norm or rather as customary be-
havior. This is particularly because the role allocation of norm sender and norm receiver is 
ambiguous. 
In other words, it is to be expected that people with more food will be more willing to ac-
cept theft than those who have less. Also, people with a dominant sharing ethos should be 
expected to tolerate theft to a larger degree than others. The description of the two Dama-
ra ladies, who explained that it was normal to take without asking, also leads to the con-
clusion that theft is more or less tolerated among family members.  
Different from what I expected there was once again a relatively high agreement among 
the people of Skoonheid and the Kanyembas with the statements that I offered to them. 
The comparison of San versus Non-San yielded only two (statistically) significant results 
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(graph 3.3.1), but a tendency towards a stricter definition of theft among the San is visible. 
A comparison of the four wealth groups also produced no statistically significant differ-
ences. However, it can be noted that questionnaire respondents in WG4 were more willing 
to tolerate theft than others. 
 
Graph 3.3.1 Disapproval of theft of X by F/N. Sorted by identity group. Tested for signifi-
cance with Wilcoxon rank-sum test, marked with asterisk if p < 0.05 and therefore signifi-
cant. 
 
 
Graph 3.3.2 Disapproval of theft of X by F/N. Sorted by wealth group. Tested for significance 
with Wilcoxon rank-sum test, no significant results found. 
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Interestingly, the highest amount of significant results was produced in the comparison of 
Skoonheid and the Kanyembas as places of living. In all cases of suggested theft the 
people of Drimiopsis were stricter than the people of Skoonheid. The differentiation be-
tween related and non-related thieves was only confirmed in Skoonheid. At this point the 
self-critical ethnographer has to question the influence that the local translators might 
have had on the results also with regard on the previous results. It was not possible to 
supervise all survey interviews, but there was no point in time where I had the feeling that 
my translators and research assistants differed with regard to diligence and competence. 
Whether different translators would have produced different results is subject to specula-
tion 
 
Graph 3.3.3 Disapproval of theft of X by F/N. Sorted by place of living. Tested for signifi-
cance with Wilcoxon rank-sum test, marked with asterisk if p < 0.05 and therefore signifi-
cant.  
 
One thing, however, seems clear: the low toleration of theft in quantitative terms stands in 
contradiction to the field observations as qualitative data. My argument at this point is that, 
once again, discourse and actual practice deviate from another as they already did in the 
previous two sections. Therefore, sharing as a social norm is put into question, because 
sanctions for norm infringement seem to be not efficient enough to actually cause a 
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3.4 A Conflict of Systems: Sharing Avoidance 
In Skoonheid and Drimiopsis ‘the first of the month’ is not defined by the Gregorian 
Calendar; when people talk about the first of the month they mean pension payout day. 
On that day a well-guarded money transporter drives through the villages of the region to 
hand out pensions, disability grants, and child support for those who lost one or both 
parents. It is the community event that everybody waits for and already in the morning the 
first pensioners are excitedly sitting at the central places although the radio tells them that 
the car is still far away. During election time the parties use this day for rallies as they are 
aware that many potential voters are around and food sellers that remain unseen for the 
rest of the month suddenly show up to make a profit as long as the money is still around. 
Shop owners use this day to collect what is owed; pensioners are allowed to take credit 
up to 600 NAD, equal the pension amount. In Skoonheid the car owners are ready to take 
people to Epukiro R.C. to immediately spend the money on food and alcohol. One would 
expect the 15-minute pension payout spectacle to be a substantial part of a network 
analysis as it marks the inflow of capital and thereby triggers sharing actions. However, 
during the time of my field research this day proved less important to the investigation of 
sharing networks than to the strategies that people employ to avoid sharing. 
In his well-known contribution “Demand Sharing: Reciprocity and the Pressure for Gener-
osity among Foragers” from 1993, Nicolas Peterson describes the different strategies that 
Australian hunter-gatherers employ to deal with the sharing demands that society makes. 
One of these strategies entails that “demands can be refused. This can usually be done 
only by hiding, secretive behavior, and lying […]: such hiding is widespread and is a fully 
self-conscious strategy” (864). Another strategy that literature offers to avoid the immedi-
ate loss of capital through demand sharing is described by Wiessner, who explains that 
capital can be stored in the form of hxaro debt (1982: 67). In the case of Skoonheid and 
Drimiopsis similar strategies have been developed by their inhabitants. 
One popular strategy, as mentioned by Peterson, is hiding. Although everybody knows 
how much the pensioners receive, some of them hide the money in their pockets and go 
home as quickly as possible. While the majority of people in Skoonheid receive their mon-
ey at the payout car, many people in Drimiopsis travel to Gobabis in order to receive the 
money at the post office and immediately store it in their bank account. Some Damara 
gentlemen even offered me money to drive them to Gobabis for that reason. Interestingly, 
most people are able to give change on payout day although the pension is paid in 200 
NAD bills and despite the fact that they were not able to buy anything in the morning. 
Sometimes even the gesture of hiding is enough to keep potential scroungers away. 
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Whenever I gave food to Patrick he quickly moved behind a wall or a tree to express his 
unwillingness to share although he remained visible. 
A different form of hiding is the avoidance of cash 
capital. Money at home is sharable money and 
therefore has to be transferred into goods or credit. I 
observed John K. and Ismael H. arguing right next 
to the payout car. Asking them about the reason for 
their argument, they explained: John had just re-
ceived outstanding disability grants and wanted to 
pay what he owed to Ismael. Ismael, however, felt 
uncomfortable bringing home more money than his 
wife expected. John insisted. Ismael took the mon-
ey, but was not able to give change to John. He 
gladly refused and told Ismael to keep it some time. 
Credit in this context seems to be more valuable 
than cash, because cash can be shared. 
The next strategy is pretense. Apart from creative pensioners who claim immediately at 
the payout car that they must have dropped the money somewhere and that they are un-
able to find it, this strategy is mostly applied in the days after. On pension payout day all 
spectators claim the same thing: “The money will be gone within a week or even tomor-
row.” (Anna A., 33yrs, Drimiopsis) and this attitude is strategy and symptom of other strat-
egies at the same time. Surely people are quick to spend the money on food and other 
necessities, but often the fact that money is quickly spent by the majority is reason 
enough for the individual to claim impecuniosity.  Within a few days after payout most 
pensioners will insist that they have nothing to share, because “the money is ALWAYS 
gone after a few days”25 (Alfons A., 58 yrs, Skoonheid). The claim to have nothing to 
share is also applied by non-pensioners on a regular basis to avoid sharing: “Maybe 
whenever I have a lot, I have to share, but with little [food in the house]… no no I cannot 
[share]”26 (Carla N., 45 yrs, Drimiopsis). However, graph 3.4.2 indicates that the willing-
ness and success to save money is relatively high, especially among the Non-San and 
WG3 and WG4. 
                                                           
25
 Translated from Afrikaans: “die geld is ALTYD weg na ‘n paar dae” 
26
 Translated from Afrikaans: “As miskien baie is, dan moet ek deel, maar as bitjie… ah ah ek kan 
nie.” 
 Picture 3.4.1 Settling debts on pension pay-out day 
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Graph 3.4.2 Statement-agreement questionnaire items 27-28: Willingness to save recently 
received money versus the success in doing so.   
 
The avoidance of communication was also among the strategies that I observed. On tell-
ing Patrick to go and get his friends as we had cooked too much rice, he simply claimed 
that he was hungry enough to finish the pot by himself. At a different occasion Jan K. (28 
yrs, Drimiopsis) complained that no-one had informed him the other day that the neighbor-
ing farmer was handing out free meat. He explained that having no family meant no shar-
ing and therefore no information whatsoever on what was going on in the location. This 
stands in direct contradiction with the observations of Lee & Hurlich: “Just as the !Kung 
and other hunter-gatherers place a high value on sharing and reciprocity of food, so do 
they emphasize sharing and reciprocity of information.” (1982: 334). 
What do these observations imply for the discussion of sharing norms? First, an interpre-
tation of sharing norms as Verhaltensgleichförmigkeit would lead to the conclusion that 
sharing avoidance is the norm and not sharing itself. Second, sharing norms as 
Verhaltensforderung implicates that the role of norm-sender (share-demander) and norm-
receiver (share-avoider) significantly influences the value of the norm. The fact that there 
is almost no household in Skoonheid without a pension receiver on payout day annuls the 
right to demand a share beyond the household structures and the obligation to positively 
respond. Third, Verhaltensbewertung is the only way that sharing could be seen as a 
norm in this context as people do complain about stingy community members. However, 
they are unwilling to go beyond the discursive level, because of their own stinginess. 
Fourth, sharing avoidance is obviously tolerated, which again puts the function and effec-
tiveness of sanctions into question. 
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3.5 Searching for Norms: Are There Sanctioning Mechanisms? 
For example27, like those people, the old people, that was living in the bush... if 
something like that [somebody being unwiling to share] happened, they used to 
talk and understand each other. They will maybe take a grandmother or someone 
to talk to him or her, to change... peacefully. And nowadays, if somebody do some-
thing like asking someone and the other one say ‘No’, so the other day he will not 
understand... start making like coming out of violence. Ja, it will start in a fight. 
(Karl L., 52 yrs, from Skoonheid; through translator from Ju/’hoansi). 
The previous sections have put into question whether sharing can be regarded as a social 
norm on the resettlement farms. This question is connected to the existence of sanctions, 
which according to Spittler are a prerequisite for the effectiveness of norms: 
Sanktionen sind nicht einfach Nachteile. Auch Abweichungen von Bräuchen haben 
nachteilige Konsequenzen. Von Sanktionen sprechen wir nur dann, wenn durch 
Reaktion gezeigt wird, daß das abweichende Verhalten nicht hingenommen wird. 
[…] Eine Reaktion nennen wir nur dann Sanktion, wenn sie der Normbrecher zu 
spüren bekommt. Mißbilligungsäußerungen, die nur gegenüber Dritten geäußert 
werden, oder innere Mißbilligung sind keine Sanktionen.“ (Spittler 1967: 27). 
Quantitative methods to test the existence of sanctions in ethnography demand a lot of 
creativity and the application of interdisciplinary approaches. To develop vignette surveys 
or large-scale economic games next to the obligatory qualitative methods was not possi-
ble in the short amount of time that I was able to invest in the field. Therefore, the follow-
ing observations and considerations must suffice at this point. 
In the weeks after my sunglasses vanished I refused to hand out oranges to Patrick and 
his friends, not only because I was upset with them, but also because I wanted to test 
them for sanctions. As expected, they uttered their disappointment, but no real sanctions 
like pranks or rude behavior followed. Often people asked for money, petrol or airtime and 
the longer I stayed, the more I tended to refuse with reference to my own lack of the like. If 
any of the people that I turned down executed sanctions that went beyond a frown or a 
short statement of regret, I did not notice them. 
This is not to say that the people in Skoonheid and Drimiopsis do not know how to sanc-
tion an outsider like me for supposedly inappropriate behavior. It is almost impossible to 
stay in Skoonheid and get acquainted with its people without upsetting those who do not 
like each other. On several occasions I was caught between the lines of inter-personal 
and inter-family conflicts, which resulted in the refusal of interviews, strategic tardiness 
and misinformation. These sanctions, however, were never directly connected with de-
clined sharing demands.                                                            
27
 Translated from Afrikaans: “Soos vorbeeld” 
53 
 
Apart from Karl’s very dramatic description above, my observations were confirmed by 
most interview partners. Aleksia J. (40 yrs, Drimiopsis) explained that there was no need 
for anger when a sharing demand was turned down even if there is plenty of food in the 
house. I asked Clara N. what people do when they are told that there is no food in the 
house for sharing. She responded: “What can you do? Just go to the next house! We 
cannot talk badly about each other.”28 Anja G., however, described the following scene: 
“When you go and ask for something, he will tell you there is nothing. As soon as you 
leave, gossip starts behind your back. Then they say: ‘That woman never gives to me, 
why should I give to her?’”29. In this case the demand itself is sanctioned and it seems that 
the only way of sanctioning sharing refusal is the reversed refusal of the like. This is, how-
ever, conditioned by the availability of deniable capital, which is not the case for a majority 
of people in Skoonheid and Drimiopsis. 
The means to sanction are a critical element in this discussion. In most economic games, 
testing the willingness to sanction the behavior of others, the participants need to invest a 
certain amount of their capital to execute punishment (Lesorogol 2007: 920). In some 
game setups not every participant is able to punish, but is assigned with this ability by the 
game supervisor. Similar conditions exist in the resettlements and the question arises: 
Who is officially responsible for sanctions? 
Looking at sanctions beyond the sharing discourse, it can be noted that new coercive 
powers have been established and reformed in Namibia by different political regimes in 
the recent century. These powers also influenced the former hunter-gatherers and their 
egalitarian structures. One of the leveling mechanisms that Woodburn discussed in “Egali-
tarian Societies” but ceased to mention in later contributions is the “access to means of 
coercion” (1982: 436). He explains that the availability of lethal weapons in hunter-
gatherer societies and the widespread ability and willingness to kill another human in se-
cret or with the toleration of society creates a powerful leveling mechanism against indi-
vidual ambitions for wealth, power and prestige. 
Today this leveling mechanism is opposed by the law and the power of the state who exe-
cutes it. Those who might have been raised on egalitarian principles are now committing a 
crime should they take the law into their own hands. Incidences of violence and even 
murder may have occurred during my stay in Skoonheid, but they were usually the prod-
uct of alcoholic rage and less of cunning ambushes. In the case of a serious dispute the                                                            
28
 Translated from Afrikaans: “Wat kan ‘n mens doen? Hy moet ander huis toe gaan! Ons mag nie 
sleg mekaar praat nie.” 
29
 Translated from Afrikaans: “As jy iets gaan vra by hom, hy ou jou klaar. As jy net gaan dan begin 
skinder agter jou. Dan sê hulle ‘die vrou ou mos nie vir my, hoekom ou ek vir haar?” 
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inhabitants of Skoonheid usually call upon the committee members, the chief, or some-
times the police in Epukiro R.C. to solve the problem. The authority of Chief Langman, 
however, is contested as soon as Non-San are involved and even some local San do not 
accept him as a leader. 
Taking this discussion back to the issue of sharing I hypothesize the following. According 
to Woodburn, egalitarian hunter-gatherers were able to control all significant aspects of 
social life through norms that were enforced by sanctions if necessary. The ability to sanc-
tion with regard to criminal misbehavior was then seized by state-based coercive powers 
and thereby caused instability in the social sanctioning system as a whole. This is not to 
say that the San have lost their willingness and ability to sanction normative misbehavior, 
but their normative system and the interconnected sanctions have been redefined by the 
surrounding societies. Sharing is not enforced by sanctions and it also is not an effective 
leveling mechanism in Skoonheid and Drimiopsis. Therefore, based on field observations 
and theoretical considerations, I argue that normative sharing as part of an egalitarian 
hunter-gatherer ideology is actually over. 
 
3.6 Economic Consequences: The Same Destiny as the Ik? 
“Sharing is over!” may lead to associations with Colin Turnbull’s book “The Mountain Peo-
ple” (1972). Turnbull spent two years in Northern Uganda living among the Ik, who had 
been resettled to the mountains outside of Kidepo National Park where they originally 
lived around Mount Morungole as hunter-gatherers. In the account of his field research he 
describes a group of people that has turned from a stereotypical hunter-gatherer society 
full of harmony and solidarity into loveless and selfish individuals, which have even aban-
doned affections of kinship. 
But in the crisis of survival facing the Ik, the family was one of the first institutions 
to go, and the Ik as a society have survived. They still insist on living in villages 
even though the villages have nothing that could be called a truly social structure, 
for they encompass no social life, and despite the fact that members of a village 
mistrust and fear each other more than any others, in direct proportion to their 
proximity and completely without regard to family and kinship. The mistrust begins 
even within the compound, between a man and his wife, and between each of 
them and their children. (133f). 
In Ik society children are abandoned by their parents at the age of three and they are 
forced to join bands of other children and teenagers in their search for food. In these 
bands they experience betrayal, suppression and learn other social-Darwinist qualities 
that they need in order to survive. Old people are not supported by their children and are 
left to die of hunger and thirst. The use of violence and deception to steal even the small-
est bit of food from a relative or neighbor has been explained by Turnbull like this: 
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It seems that they have come to a recognition of what they accept as man’s basic 
selfishness, of his natural determination to survive as an individual before all else. 
This they consider to be man’s basic right, and at least they have the decency to 
allow others to pursue that right to the best of their ability without recrimination and 
blame. (182). 
As cause of this negative transformation he designates the forced expulsion from an envi-
ronment of natural and spiritual richness and the resettlement into a region tormented by 
drought and inter-ethnic violence. The changes in subsistence based on the establish-
ment of agriculture, cattle raiding and trading with surrounding groups may also have pro-
voked the change in society. 
Many of Turnbull’s descriptions and theoretical assumptions about the origin and structure 
of Ik society have been falsified or have at least been subject to legitimate discussions 
based on methodological criticism (Barth 1974, Wilson et al. 1975) and more accurate 
empirical findings (Heine 1985). However, he illustrates in a dramatic but plausible way 
the conception that environment, economy, spirituality and social cohesion are so tightly 
connected that the disturbance of just a single one of them may cause a whole system to 
collapse. 
In this case, Turnbull’s account of the Ik and a comparison with characteristics of the 
Omaheke San functions as a bridgehead for the analysis of the connection between shar-
ing and economic performance. The approach that both groups used to be hunter-
gatherers which were eventually resettled is too simplistic, however. This would not do 
justice to the political complexities and the different historical trajectories that have entan-
gled these groups. However, their subsequent subsistence change towards agriculture is 
of importance as it also brought the confrontation with delayed return. 
Their resettled status has forced them to develop a new system of inter-ethnic coopera-
tion. Interestingly, both Ik and some San groups have similar creation myths in which their 
role as marginalized group in such an inter-ethnic system is expressed: 
During the creation God gave the Dodos and Turkana cattle, so they always have 
food. But he also gave them the spear, so they kill. God gave the Ik the nakut, or 
digging stick, and told them not to kill. But he also gave them nyeg, hunger. That is 
why, my saintly old informants never failed to tell me, it was the duty of everyone 
else to give the Ik cows, goats, sugar, tobacco, and lots of money. (Turnbull 1972: 
186). 
The Hai||om woman found an iron [bar] and a hoe. But then the white woman 
snatched [tsabu] the iron from her and stole [|ã] it. And the Owambo woman 
grabbed the hoe. Hence the Hai||om woman was left with a wooden stick only, 
which she sharpened to use for digging out bush food […] that is why the Owambo 
now have gardens and millets [sãu-e]. And that is why the white people have the 
store and machines while the Hai||om gather bush food. (Widlok 1999: 47). 
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These myths do not only express the interconnectedness of subsistence mode and mar-
ginalization. They mirror an identity system of learned helplessness and acceptance of an 
inferior status. Actually, many people in Skoonheid and Drimiopsis talk positively about 
their role during Apartheid as farm laborers, trackers and housemaids. When asked, most 
of them would choose a life as laborers for the baas rather than returning to foraging in 
the bush. 
Turnbull’s Ik uphold a gift-exchange network that resembles the hxaro of the !Kung and 
they uphold a sharing ethos solely based on discursive practices and less on actual ex-
changes of support. Both groups have a wide repertoire of sharing avoidance tactics. 
While they still retain the quaint old-fashioned notion that man should share with 
his fellows, they place the individual good above all else and almost demand that 
each get away with as much as he can without his fellows knowing. […] What was 
not seen by the others did not belong to them. I began to see why the Ik did not go 
in and out of each other’s compounds, and why these seemed even more tightly 
shut off from each other than the village as a whole was from the outside. In build-
ing these fortresses they were defending themselves not from some outside ene-
my, but from each other. (Turnbull 1972: 101). 
However, there are also significant differences between the Ik and the people of 
Skoonheid and Drimiopsis, the first being the persistence of affectionate social structures. 
The Ik have reduced the family to its economic advantages and disadvantages. For the 
people in Skoonheid and Drimiopsis it remains an institution of moral obligation and affec-
tionate connectedness. This is the case for all people on the resettlement farms and not 
only for those who claim hunter-gatherer heritage. Although the final argument of the pre-
vious section was that sharing can no longer be seen as a social norm in Skoonheid and 
Drimiopsis, their inhabitants are yet far from the Ik’s destiny. This is also due to differ-
ences in their history. The Ik were resettled, forced to practice agriculture and in that con-
text their society’s norms began to fall apart. For the Omaheke San there is no such clear-
cut order of events. They were incorporated into new cultural and economic systems sev-
eral times in the past centuries and when they finally were resettled to Skoonheid and 
Drimiopsis their identity as San was once again redefined by external and internal forces 
(see sections 1.2 and 3.7). 
The most important difference in this context concerns the economic correlations and the 
argument structure that is derived from them. In the case of the Ik the collapse of their 
economy caused a collapse of society. With regard to the Omaheke San, the causal chain 
and argument structure is reversed: the resettlement process got stuck in economic dis-
appointment and the question arises whether this was due to socio-normative structures 
of sharing. In the research setup it was argued that stronger sharing norms among the 
San than amongst other groups of the area could be an explanation for their weak eco-
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nomic performance. Now that it was found that sharing cannot be regarded as a social 
norm anymore, different potential explanations must be reconsidered. 
The San deserve that their role as passive victims of surrounding societies is questioned 
to a certain extent. The missing differences between the sharing practices of the San and 
their neighbors do not necessarily imply that they have fallen victim to external pressures. 
It could very well be that the surrounding groups adapted certain norms from the San and 
therefore there is little difference between them. However, looking at historical develop-
ments, the field evidence on avoidance strategies, missing sanctioning mechanisms and 
the schism between discourse and practice this scenario remains unlikely. 
What does the persistence or the abandonment of sharing norms imply for economic per-
formance? Biesele & Hitchcock have observed among resettled Ju/’hoansi in Nyae Nyae 
area that “When people refused to share the few resources that they were able to obtain, 
reciprocity systems were disrupted and social tensions increased” (2011: 10). In this case 
the abandonment of sharing constitutes an economic disadvantage while the original ar-
gument of this paper was based on the assumption that sharing in a delayed-return sys-
tem of wage labor and agriculture inhibits economic progress: 
[M]any !Kung are really torn between the desire to accumulate goods and the de-
sire to remain within a secure system of mutual help. It is not uncommon to see a 
person work hard for a while, accumulate goods, come under more and more 
pressure to give them away in hxaro, and finally give in and redistribute them […] 
partially because the ideology of generosity and equality is such a strong force in 
!Kung life. A person who has been stingy for too long feels miserable. (Wiessner 
1982: 82). 
Two items (29-30) on the statement-agreement questionnaire aimed to find out how shar-
ing demands by society influence the effort that people invest in their own economic suc-
cess. Item 29 asked them whether they were willing to increase their work effort in order 
to meet an increase of demands by other people. Item 30 asked them to indicate whether 
an increase of sharing demands caused loss of motivation (moral resignation) in them. 
The first item resulted in a relatively high agreement rate among all relevant contrast 
groups, except for WG3. The degree of resignation was generally lower than the willing-
ness to increase effort. However, by subtracting the values of item 30 from those of item 
29, two groups indicate significantly higher values than the others. This means that the 
Non-San and WG4 have an economically more convenient attitude with regard to the 
equilibrium of motivation and resignation. 
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Graph 3.6.1 Effort increase versus resignation upon increase of sharing demands. 
 
It seems that the disadvantage of the San lies in the fact that they hold on to a discourse 
which creates sharing as one ideal part of their culture. However, this does not corre-
spond to their needs and actual motivation. As graph 3.6.1 shows, it is not the San who 
are highly motivated to increase their work effort, but the Non-San and those who have 
already been successful in the accumulation of relative wealth (i.e. WG4). The San are 
caught between a sharing discourse and non-sharing practice. There is no fully working 
reciprocal system, no working egalitarian leveling-mechanism, but a discourse that still 
constructs an ideal of San culture. This study does not aim – and never has – solely to 
blame the San’s sharing discourse for their poor economic performance, but this discur-
sive construct which obviously lacks the conviction to turn it into practice is surely not an 
advantage. 
 
3.7 Apartheid’s Legacy: Ethnic Divides Block Sharing and Progress 
John K. was among the first people that I became acquainted with in Skoonheid and he 
was also among the first to be resettled to Skoonheid in 1993. Talking about that time, he 
mentions that he did not yet have a beard when he arrived, obviously referring to it as a 
proof of increased maturity today. He explains that Skoonheid gave him the opportunity to 
create something out of nothing. At first sight this statement might seem confusing as his 
family is amongst those who struggle the most in Skoonheid in terms of money and local 
politics. However, when one gets to know the story of his life before Skoonheid, it quickly 
85 87 86 
89 
68 
91 91 
81 
86 
72 
61 
70 73 
53 
61 
73 
62 
68 
13 
27 
16 16 15 
30 
18 19 18 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Sa
n
N
o
n
-
Sa
n
W
G
1
W
G
2
W
G
3
W
G
4
Ka
n
ye
m
ba
s
Sk
oo
n
he
id
to
ta
l
%
 
a
gr
e
e
m
e
n
t 
How to deal with an increase of demands 
effort increase resignation
difference
59 
 
becomes clear why he is so passionate about the few positive developments of the past 
decades. 
His parents were farm laborers who had to regularly change their place of employment in 
Omaheke Region. Moving with them he started farm work at an early age. Then, in 1981 
he was recruited as a tracker and later also as a sharpshooter by the South-West African 
Territorial Force (SWATF), who had started recruiting San in 1974 (Hurlich & Lee 1982: 
335) by the command of the South African Defense Forces (SADF): “A significant reason 
for military recruitment was the belief that Bushmen were ‘natural’ trackers and thus would 
be effective counterinsurgency operatives” (Gordon 2000b: 2). He was involved in the 
guerilla war between the South African colonial forces and the nationalist forces of the 
South-West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) until 1987. “I hunted Wambos.”30 is all 
he says when he is asked about his former job description. Eventually, three bullets of a 
SWAPO soldier hit his shoulder and stomach. He survived and was brought to South Afri-
ca for three months of medical rehabilitation. He lost a kidney and currently suffers from 
back aches, which enables him to receive a monthly pension from the government since 
late 2014. After his time in the army he survived with small jobs in Gobabis area until he 
finally moved to Drimiopsis and was resettled to Skoonheid in 1993. 
Unlike many others he is able to talk about his war experiences and shares them with his 
children and friends. When asked how he feels today about the things he had to do in the 
war he looks at the ground and says: “Now I do not know if it was good. All what I did was 
a job. That is what you have to understand. That is how it came and now it is over. […] 
Well, let bygones be bygones.”31 At the presidential elections in 2014 he supported 
SWAPO as he is thankful for the support that he received from the government. Further-
more, he insists that the racial divides of Apartheid’s legacy have to be abandoned to fo-
cus on the struggle against unjust hierarchies in Skoonheid: “We cannot stay with Dama-
ras and San on different sides. We have to live and work together. Not separate!”32 
In fact, John is among the few San in Skoonheid, who openly criticize the chief’s family for 
supposedly abusing their power and his dismissive perspective on the racial divides that 
characterize the village unfortunately remains an exception. There is almost no issue in 
Skoonheid that is not based on racial politics, sharing as well:                                                            
30
 Translated from Afrikaans: “Ek was hunting die Bamboes.” (i.e. SWAPO soldiers) 
31
 Translated from Afrikaans: “Ek weet nou nie: was dit goed? All wat ek gedoen het… dit is ‘n 
werk. Dit moet jy net verstaan. Dit het so gekom en dit is verby. […] Ja, wat verby is verby.” Note: 
The last sentence was also spoken in Afrikaans as a gesture of reconciliation by Nelson Mandela 
at his inauguration as president of South Africa in 1994.  
32
 Translated from Afrikaans: “ Ons kan nie Damaras daar en San anderkant bly nie. Ons moet 
saam bly en saam werk. Nie apart nie!” 
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We don’t know how Jesus made us. But if another tribe ask something here at this 
San tribe, they are just giving easily out, but if a San guy go and ask something at 
another guy, another tribe he will say you are stupid, you don’t know how to use it. 
But it’s the same thing that they are asking and they are just given. So that’s how 
slowly how we are not getting along. (Karl L., 52 yrs, from Skoonheid; through 
translator from Ju/’hoansi). 
The people they are not united. They is in groups. There is a divide. Let me tell 
you straight: The most of the people are San, but they divided them in themselves. 
Who are the real Damaras? […] There is none. The other people what they call 
Damaras, their mother is a real San and only the father is Damara. What shall you 
call them? […] The San here are divided like the peoples of Israel. They speak one 
language, but they are tribes, they are divided. […] The difference between the 
Wambos and the San is in the blood. The San are not cattle people. They is afraid 
of the west, the cars and so. […] When the outside people are going to the Chief 
here, he will tell you ‘The Damara people want to push us down. They want this 
place alone here.’ But where is the Damara people here, tell me? (James B., 65 
yrs, from Skoonheid). 
At the end of section 3.6 I mentioned that a fractured sharing ethos cannot be blamed for 
the economic failure of the resettlement farms alone. This is mostly due to the fact that in 
many minds the divides of Apartheid time persist and interfere with cooperation-based 
development. The fate of the San of Omaheke Region has significantly been influenced 
by Apartheid policy. For centuries it created a mindset of inferiority and after independ-
ence the San have remained among the most marginalized groups of Namibia. However, 
due to the efforts of governmental and non-governmental organizations there are 
Ju/’hoansi in Skoonheid and Drimiopsis today who are aware of their rights and who are 
not afraid to accuse suppression. However, the development of a San leadership structure 
has not only caused problems with reference to the discussion of authentic indigeneity, 
but also burdens the relationship to their neighbors. Unfortunately, the awareness of sup-
pression is often aimed at the wrong people. Many Non-San citizens of Skoonheid and 
Drimiopsis suffer from poverty as well and feel patronized by the empowerment discourse 
and left alone by the government. For instance drought relief is only distributed to San in 
both resettlements and the Ju/’hoansi leaders accuse everyone who disagrees with them 
of being aggressors and of having a suppressive attitude. 
Those groups, which have been lumped together under the label of ‘Non-San’ in this the-
sis for analytical purposes, surely deserve differentiation. Many Nama in the resettlements 
are not granted a representative identity as they speak the ‘Damara-language’ 
(Khoekhoegowab) and therefore receive the label ‘Damara’. There are Herero, Kavango 
and Caprivians who are all labeled ‘Wambo’ due to their skin color. Those who have par-
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ents of different cultural and linguistic origin are often referred to as basters33, which can 
be both burden and advantage, depending on the person’s ability to change identity stra-
tegically. 
In a nutshell, racial divides and mistrust remain dominant in Skoonheid and Drimiopsis 
and make interethnic cooperation a difficult challenge to all who try to promote social and 
economic progress. A common normative system, possibly independent from hunter-
gatherer ideologies of sharing, would surely be helpful. For that purpose, the rhetoric of 
Bird-David’s metaphor of inter-connected vessels may be applied, which originally aims to 
explain hunter-gatherer sharing habits among the Nayaka in South India: 
[I]magine a series of vessels, independent each of the other, into each of which 
liquid is poured such that each receives an equal share. Only to the extent that 
they are similar will the vessels be filled to the same level. In the second case, im-
agine connected vessels: according to the so-called ‘law of connected vessels’, 
should liquid be poured into any one of them, it will flow from one to another until it 
fills them all to the same level. The vessels themselves need not be the same […]. 
Without an intentional intervening design, the leveling is attained because they are 
connected. (Bird-David 2005: 212). 
Going beyond the metaphor’s reference to sharing habits it is necessary for the inhabit-
ants of the group resettlement farms to overcome the divides that Apartheid policy creat-
ed. They need to create their own (normative) inter-connectedness in work effort and re-
turn in order to improve their economic situation. 
                                                           
33
 From Afrikaans: “bastard” 
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4. Two Experiments and a Conclusion 
I was approached by the captain of Skoonheid’s football team around mid-October. A 
tournament was to be held next Saturday, but the team had not been able to raise enough 
money to participate (500 NAD per team), due to delayed salary payments. I was asked to 
sponsor 400 NAD, but instead chose to conduct a small experiment with the team mem-
bers to test their sharing avoidance and their willingness to contribute to a common good. 
I regarded an economic game as a good way to get an insight into this topic although it 
was of little representative value due to the rather biased sample of informants. 
The experiment was conducted on Friday afternoon before the football tournament and 
lasted for a bit more than one hour. I asked the captain to choose 15 players with good 
team spirit, who came to Skoonheid’s administration building. They were asked to see me 
in the office one after another. No other persons were present in the office. Each player 
was given the chance to roll a die and receive the tenfold amount in NAD, so that the min-
imum amount would be 10 NAD and the maximum amount would be 60 NAD. Afterwards 
they were asked to decide how much they would like to keep for themselves and how 
much they would like to give to the team. They were informed that the personal amount 
would only be paid out one week later while the team’s amount would be paid out right 
after the end of the experiment. The amount that was to be given to the team was written 
down on a piece of paper and given to the player. The amount that they wanted to keep 
for themselves was noted on a separate piece of paper that remained with me. I ensured 
each of them that the other team players would not be able to find out what the individual 
had rolled or contributed. 
As a second step, the amounts were added up in front of all the players and they were 
asked to discuss the result for ten minutes. After a while, the players were then informed 
about the total sum that had been set aside and that they would have the chance to con-
tribute to the team for a second time. Those players who wanted to do so came to the 
office and let me know how much of the money that they had set aside was to be contrib-
uted to the team. The full amount was then announced and handed over to the team 
manager. 
In the first round eleven players gave the larger amount of money to the team with eight of 
them contributing the whole amount that they had received from the die-roll. Three players 
decided to split the amount in half and one decided to keep the greater amount to himself. 
Altogether 445 NAD out of possible 540 NAD was contributed by the players to the whole 
team in the first round. In the second round five players out of the seven who had kept 
some money aside decided to make another contribution. In the end there was another 55 
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NAD on the table, so that 500 NAD was given to the team and 40 NAD was left to three 
individual players. 
Before the experiment I expected to find high sharing avoidance in this group, because 
they had been unable or unwilling to raise enough money for the tournament out of their 
own funds. Afterwards, my expectations were proven wrong as the majority of players 
contributed a reasonably large amount to the team rather than keeping most of the money 
to themselves. Several explanations were tested, ranging from different degrees of will-
ingness to contribute, free-rider psychology and long-term versus short-term orientation. 
Identity and language seemed to offer no adequate explanation. The few significant differ-
ences according to language yielded that the Otjiherero-speakers were the least selfish 
while the San were the least willing to share. 
A few hours later I found a potential explanation for the players’ generous behavior. When 
I asked the coach who would be playing at the tournament, he explained that there was a 
first team (Team A) and a second team (Team B) and that only the players from the first 
team would be playing in the tournament as there was only money for one team. I inquired 
who from the experiment participants played for which team; it turned out that ten (out of 
15) were playing for the second team. I assume that the likelihood of playing in the tour-
nament due to the internal structures of the team influenced the experiment’s result. In 
both teams a very small amount was kept by the players for themselves: 7.1% of the 
available money was held back by Team A and 7.5% was held back by Team B. A signifi-
cant difference can only be observed comparing first round and second round contribu-
tions. It seems that Team B was more willing to contribute in the first round than Team A. 
Possibly the experiment participants of Team B were hoping to raise enough money for a 
second team to participate for Skoonheid in the tournament. However, when they realized 
in the group discussion that the contributed money would only be enough for one team to 
participate, Team A was willing and able to contribute more, while Team B realized that 
they could just as well keep the money. 
The fact that only one team would be playing caused an intense argument between play-
ers and team management. Team A was mostly dominated by Damara, Herero and 
Wambos while Team B consisted mainly of San. Coach and captain were accused of un-
dermining the San people in the team. This was due to the fact that it had been mostly 
Team B players who had gained the money in the experiment. After a daylong argument, 
300 NAD were raised by the team and I agreed to contribute another 200 NAD, so that 
both teams were now able to participate in the tournament. This shows that unwillingness 
to contribute must have been at least partly a reason for the lack of team funds. Team B 
lost the first game 0:7 while team A made it to the final where they lost 4:1. 
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The second experiment that I dared to conduct ended even more chaotically and added 
more turmoil to my reputation as a bush greenhorn in Skoonheid. Inspired by Richard B. 
Lee’s essay “Eating Christmas in the Kalahari” (1969), I decided to give a farewell party to 
say thank you to the people of Skoonheid for hosting me in the previous months. In his 
famous essay Lee described how he made a generous gift to the !Kung by buying a well-
nourished ox for their Christmas celebrations. However, he experienced that the !Kung 
ridiculed him and denigrated the meat that he had bought. Further he found out that they 
did so to everyone who managed to bring valuable food and other goods into the 
community. It turned out that the !Kung used ridicule and demotion as a protection 
mechanism against arrogance and pride as Lee’s friend Tamazo told him: 
‘Yes, when a young man kills much meat he comes to think of himself as a chief or 
a big man, and he thinks of the rest of us as his servants or inferiors. We can’t ac-
cept this. We refuse one who boasts, for someday his pride will make him kill 
somebody. So we always speak of his meat as worthless. This way we cool his 
heart and make him gentle.’ (Lee 1969: 4). 
Surely the fact that the date chosen for the party, December 6th, marked St. Nicolas Day, 
which is celebrated as a pre-Christmas event in Germany and other countries, motivated 
me even more to choose a fat cow for slaughtering and start my own “Eating Christmas in 
the Omaheke” experiment. My expectations were rather vague as anything similar to 
Lee’s experience seemed unlikely to happen based on my previous observations. 
I approached the chairman of Skoonheid’s community committee and asked him to find 
somebody who was willing to sell a cow for slaughtering. Very soon a willing seller was 
found, the cow was examined and a price was negotiated. However, on that same day I 
received a couple of puzzling messages from other villagers while buying maize meal for 
the celebration in Gobabis. They were telling me not to buy the cow, because a group of 
San gentlemen, including the committee chairman and the seller of the cow, had already 
made up a plan how to keep Damaras and other Non-San people away from the meat. 
When I returned to Skoonheid, several San and Damaras told me to cancel the event, 
because they feared that fighting would start as soon as the cow was led to the slaughter-
ing place. The chairman and others insisted that they had never made such plans and 
some Damaras produced even more absurd facts about the plan to reserve the meat sole-
ly for the San. I knew that arguing would not stop until the deal was canceled. After con-
sulting with trusted people in Skoonheid and the involved NGOs I decided to cancel the 
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purchase of the cow and to buy ‘neutral’ boerewors34 from an external farmer. I thought of 
it as the handiest option when it came to sharing with large groups of people and I hoped 
that nobody would be able to make special claims on this external purchase. The seller of 
the cow understood my problem and was happy himself for not being at the center of at-
tention anymore. However, his brother and the chairman seemed to interpret my cancella-
tion of the cow purchase as an offence against all San people of Skoonheid. They told me 
to cancel the whole event when I approached them for help with the preparations. 
Initially, Lee’s perspective that the San tried to downplay the meat donation to inhibit my 
own ambitions could have been applied to this demand. Also the following description by 
Woodburn might have explained the situation by referring to the lost amount of money that 
would have enriched the community through the cow purchase: 
The evidence suggests that people find it exceptionally difficult, even intolerable, to 
give up or to limit their entitlement to share and equally difficult to accept the 
wealth or the authority or the superior status of any of their kin, their friends or oth-
er members in their own community. (Woodburn 2005: 24). 
By referring to Chief Langman’s authority, however, I was told by the chairman to bring 
the meat to DuPlessis where all the Damaras stayed as I was no friend of the San any-
more in his eyes. This demand not only negated his entitlement to a share, but also 
acknowledged the superior status of one of his kin. 
Intense arguments between community members followed and even threats were ex-
changed in the two days to come: “Here is the problem of the San: when somebody 
comes to help and say ‘Thank you’ you tell him to fuck off [vulg.]. That is why the San are 
doing so badly. You are stupid!”35 and “The Damaras and Wambos have always sup-
pressed us… that is something that even the Lord does not forgive”36 were among the 
less intense sentences that I was able to record37. It needs to be mentioned explicitly that 
this conflict took place only between a few individuals while the rest of the community 
could not have cared less. In the end I cancelled the official event, but my host Siyaya, his 
family, friends from the village and I happened to have a ‘little’ braai38 at the farm house 
anyway. 70 kilograms of boerewors had to be consumed somehow and most passersby                                                            
34
 From Afrikaans: “farmer’s sausage”; a popular South African grill sausage made of beef, lamb 
and sometimes pork or ostrich. In colloquial conversation it is also referred to as ‘boerie’. 
35
 Translated from Afrikaans: “Dis die problem van die San mense: as iemand kom en wil help en 
wil ‘Dankie’ sê, julle maak net ‘fuck off’. Daarom is die San mense so swak. Julle is dom!” 
36
 Translated from Afrikaans: “Die Damaras en die Wambos het ons altyd onderdruk… dis iets wat 
selfs die Heere nooit vergewe.”  
37
 I have refrained from mentioning names or even pseudonyms at this point due to the explosive 
content.  
38
 From Afrikaans: “barbecue / grill” 
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sat down and got a piece of ‘boerie’, most of them being children. Finally I was able to 
celebrate St. Nicolas Day in the Omaheke, although it turned out a lot different from what I 
originally had in mind. 
One might suspect that the cow disaster influenced my choice of the thesis title and this is 
true to a certain extent. It took this final week of my stay to make sense out of the gath-
ered data, because observations and quantitative data differed to such a great extent. I 
found eventually that sharing has become a matter of identity and racialized politics as 
both San and Damara in Skoonheid have little solidarity left for one another. 
The two experiments show that there is more to sharing than any simplistic or essentialist 
interpretation can grasp. It is not a simple matter that can be explained by altruism, reci-
procity or ideology. It is influenced by circumstances of politics, identities and discursive 
exchange in an increasingly complicated world: “sharing among humans is best under-
stood as the result of complex forms of interactions” (Widlok 2013: 16). 
Returning to the research questions, the discussion of this thesis has shown that sharing 
in Skoonheid and Drimiopsis may be one of the many tools that individuals and groups 
use to shape their cultural identity. However, the network analysis revealed a schism be-
tween the discursive construction of sharing and actual sharing practice as soon as peo-
ple outside of the family are concerned. The lack of efficient sanctioning mechanisms 
showed that sharing may be regarded as a custom and part of an oral tradition but defi-
nitely not as a social norm. Therefore I argue that James B. was right when he claimed 
that “sharing is over”. 
It was found that there is no significant difference between the San and their neighbors 
with regard to the application of sharing in common discourse. Other factors are much 
more dominant than identity (San or Non-San) in the study of sharing norms in Skoonheid 
and Drimiopsis. Individual wealth, character of the exchanged goods, place of living, and 
strategic and reciprocal social networks inside and outside of the family play a much more 
important role in the description of sharing and its economic consequences. 
Leaving abstract considerations on sharing behind, it is not easy to find an appropriate 
final statement for this thesis, which gives concrete perspectives and advice with regard to 
the economic process in Skoonheid and Drimiopsis. This is due to the complexity of the 
answers given above. The helpfulness of my field research to the local decision makers 
will have to be judged by them. Regarding the future of Namibian group resettlements, 
however, I insist that it will depend to a large extent on the ability of individuals to include 
inter-cultural cooperation mechanisms into their identity systems. Ending on a quote, it 
becomes clear that rather outdated ethnographic observations remain up-to-date as long 
as they are reinterpreted in the context of inter-cultural resettlement conflicts: 
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Like individuals in any society, foragers have to struggle with their own internal 
contradictions…. The demands of the collective existence are not achieved effort-
lessly, but rather they require a continuing struggle to deal with one’s own selfish, 
arrogant and antisocial impulses. (Lee 1982 in Patterson 2006: 60). 
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